

1 Published benefits of ivermectin 2 use in Itajaí, Brazil for COVID-19 3 infection, hospitalisation, and 4 mortality are entirely explained by 5 statistical artefacts

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Data and code availability:
All data is publicly available from previous publications or public databases of the Brazil Ministry of Health. Links are provided at the end of the Methods section. Source code to reproduce the analyses here is available at <https://github.com/gtuckerkellogg/itajai-reanalysis>.

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11 Abstract

12 Background

13 Two recent publications by Kerr et al. (Cureus 14(1):e21272; Cureus 14(8): e28624) reported
14 dramatic effects of prophylactic ivermectin use for both prevention of COVID-19 and
15 reduction of COVID-19-related hospitalisation and mortality, including a dose-dependent
16 effect of ivermectin prophylaxis. These papers have gained an unusually large public
17 influence: they were incorporated into debates around COVID-19 policies and may have
18 contributed to decreased trust in vaccine efficacy and public health authorities more broadly.
19 Both studies were based on retrospective observational analysis of city-wide registry data
20 from the city of Itajaí, Brazil from July-December 2020.

21 Methods

22 Starting with initially identified sources of error, we conducted a revised statistical analysis of
23 available data, including data made available with the original papers and public data from
24 the Brazil Ministry of Health. We identified additional uncorrected sources of bias and errors
25 from the original analysis, including incorrect subject exclusion and missing subjects, an
26 enrolment time bias, and multiple sources of immortal time bias. In models assuming no
27 actual effect from ivermectin use, we conducted Monte Carlo simulations to estimate the
28 contribution of these biases to any observed effect.

29 Results

30 Untreated statistical artefacts and methodological errors alone lead to dramatic apparent
31 risk reduction associated with ivermectin use in both studies. The magnitude of apparent risk
32 reduction from these artefacts is comparable to the results reported by the studies
33 themselves, including apparent protection from infection, hospitalisation, and death, and
34 including the reported apparent dose-response relationship.

35 Conclusions

36 The inference of ivermectin efficacy reported in both papers is unsupported, as the observed
37 effects are entirely explained by untreated statistical artefacts and methodological errors.
38 Our re-analysis calls for caution in interpreting highly publicised observational studies and
39 highlights the importance of common sources of bias in clinical research.

NOTE: This preprint reports new research that has not been certified by peer review and should not be used to guide clinical practice.

41 Introduction

42 The first half of 2020 was marked by both the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic and frantic
43 efforts around the globe to prevent and contain its spread. Most of those initial efforts relied
44 on non-pharmaceutical interventions (e.g., social distancing, masks, travel restrictions, and re-
45 gional lockdowns) to “flatten the curve” and reduce the strain on healthcare systems before
46 effective treatments and vaccines became available [1, 2]. As the pandemic unfolded, health-
47 care systems worldwide rapidly became overburdened with an increasing number of severely
48 ill patients and high COVID-19 mortality rates.

49 In Brazil, there was immense interest in early COVID-19 treatment during the initial phase
50 of the pandemic, including the potential use of the anti-parasitic drug ivermectin [3]. While
51 there was no clinical evidence of ivermectin efficacy for COVID-19, initial *in vitro* studies at the
52 time had shown potential antiviral activity of ivermectin in cell culture [4], which fuelled interest
53 in its use. Starting in July 2020, the city of Itajaí (in the southern Brazil state of Santa Catarina)
54 [5, 6] implemented a controversial city-wide program in July 2020 as a potential COVID-19 pro-
55 phylaxis. Eligible residents were offered ivermectin pills with an intermittent dosing schedule
56 of 0.2 mg/kg of body weight (up to a maximum 24 mg for those above 90 kg body weight) each
57 day for two consecutive days, repeated every 15 days.

58 In two closely related retrospective analysis studies of the Itajaí program, Kerr, Cadegiani
59 et al. [7, hereafter KC22] and Kerr, Baldi et al. [8, hereafter KB22] made dramatic claims of iver-
60 mectin benefit. KC22 concluded that using ivermectin in the Itajaí program resulted in a 44%
61 reduction in COVID-19 infections. Among all infected individuals, KC22 reported 37% reduction
62 in hospitalisation and 43% reduction in mortality associated with ivermectin use. These already
63 dramatic results were even larger after the application of propensity score matching (PSM) and
64 adjustment for other covariates. Furthermore, KB22 presented an even more startling dose-
65 dependent benefit among infected individuals: the so-called “strictly regular” ivermectin users
66 experienced a 92% reduction in mortality compared to non-users and an 82% reduction com-
67 pared to irregular users.

68 These two papers gained significant public attention and contributed to ongoing public
69 policy debates, both about COVID-19 treatment and prevention, and about trust in the medical
70 and scientific establishment. Each paper has an Altmetric score in the top five per cent of *all*
71 scientific research, has been the subject of news reporting, and has been shared on social
72 media or viewed at the journal site hundreds of thousands of times. KC22 and KB22 have also
73 attracted the attention of fact-checkers, but published critiques to date have mostly focused
74 either on the limits of observational studies in general or on missing covariates and superficial
75 peer review of these papers specifically [9–11]. In response, the Editor in Chief of Cureus has
76 defended the peer review process and subsequent publication of these studies [12].

77 Given the widespread dissemination and discussion of these papers, it is crucial to pro-
78 vide an unbiased critique to foster a more informed public debate on scientific and medical
79 research, ultimately helping to protect the public from scientific misinformation [13, 14]. This
80 unbiased critique is particularly significant for influential papers addressing polarising topics
81 of public interest, such as the use of ivermectin as a treatment for COVID-19 [15].

82 In this work, we take a direct approach by reanalysing the data available from KC22 and
83 KB22 and combining it with public data from the Brazilian Health Ministry. We identify a va-
84 riety of important statistical fallacies and other errors, and use simulations to estimate the
85 consequences of leaving these issues untreated. Our analysis demonstrates that the seem-
86 ingly dramatic benefits of prophylactic ivermectin for COVID-19, as reported in both KC22 and
87 KB22, can be entirely attributed to unresolved statistical fallacies present in the original analy-
88 ses. The code for all analyses presented in this manuscript can be found on GitHub, ensuring
89 the reproducibility of our findings.

90 Results

91 The data from KC22 and KB22

92 The analyses of KC22 and KB22 compared events (infections, hospitalisations, and deaths) be-
93 tween participants in the program (who volunteered to take ivermectin as a *prophylactic* agent)

94 and non-participants within a fixed study period (from July 7 through December 2, 2020). KC22
95 described the data set as *excluding* individuals who tested positive from the registry data prior
96 to July 7, 2020.

97 KC22 combined two data sets: one of the participants in the ivermectin prophylaxis pro-
98 gram and the other from a citywide population registry to retrieve non-participants' data. As
99 we received no response about the availability of original data sets after contacting both the
100 city authorities in Itajaí and the authors of KC22 and KB22, we restricted our analysis to KC22
101 supplementary data on OSF posted with KC22 by the corresponding author Flavio Cadegiani
102 and official public data from the Brazil Ministry of Health.

103 KC22 claimed virtually no missing values in the data because of mandatory reporting and
104 indeed, most fields for each individual record were completely filled in. However, crucial infor-
105 mation was missing for *all* participants in the data. For example, the amount of medicine for an
106 individual was a function of weight (≤ 0.2 mg ivermectin/kg body weight/day for two days every
107 15 days), but neither body weight nor dosage category are reported. The KC22 data also failed
108 to include any dates other than the date of birth; dates of program enrolment, medication
109 collection, infection, hospitalisation, or death were all missing.

110 Data entry errors in KC22 data were not uncommon. For example, while the maximum
111 possible total ivermectin usage over the study period was 80 tablets, hundreds of users were
112 recorded as having more than 80, and in some cases thousands, of tablets.

113 **KC22 mistakenly included prior infections and hospitalisations, primarily in the** 114 **non-user group**

115 Dates of infection were absent in the KC22 uploaded data. Fortunately, official public data from
116 the Brazilian Health Ministry's Unified Health System (SUS) provides detailed information for
117 all hospitalised COVID-19 patients in the national territory and includes related dates of initial
118 symptoms. To confirm that infections before July 7 2020 were correctly excluded, we matched
119 Itajaí residents from the SUS data with infected individuals from the KC22 data based on the
120 date of birth, sex, and 2020 COVID-19 hospitalisation and death. Most hospitalised individu-
121 als in KC22 matched Brazilian Health Ministry data (138/185, 75%). To our surprise, COVID-19
122 symptom onset occurred before July 7, 2020 in 35 of the matched individuals, and the vast
123 majority (29/35, 83%) were classified as non-users in the KC22 analysis (Table 1A, $p < 0.001$ for
124 association between treatment group and mistaken inclusion). When we looked at subgroups
125 by mortality for those hospitalised individuals, the bias for mistaken inclusion of early infec-
126 tions in the non-user group was even more severe for those who died (21 non-users, 2 user)
127 than for those who survived (8 non-users, 4 users, Table 1B).

128 Because the SUS data set is focused on hospitalisations, we do not have any direct evidence
129 that the biased inclusion of pre-study infections in the non-participant group extends to non-
130 hospitalised subjects. However, the mistaken pre-study enrolment of non-users accounted
131 for 41% of matched hospitalised non-users, and all infected non-users were included in the
132 propensity score matching of KC22, so the impact of this mistake alone was dramatic.

133 **KC22 data was biased towards a subset of early infections**

134 KC22 and KB22 severely under-reported hospitalisations and deaths from COVID-19 in Itajaí.
135 KC22 reported 185 total hospitalisations from a study population of 159,561 (0.12% hospi-
136 talised); official government data reports 2863 Itajaí (adult pop. 161,545, 1.8%) adult hospi-
137 talisations for COVID-19 in 2020, of which 1659 had symptom onset during the KC22 study
138 period. Among those 1659 hospitalisations there were 499 reported deaths - a citywide post-
139 hospitalisation COVID death rate of 30.1% during the study period. In contrast, KC22 reports
140 141 deaths and 185 hospitalisations during the same period, dramatically under-reporting
141 both outcomes while simultaneously more than doubling the post-hospitalisation death rate to
142 76.2%. KC22 claimed that 71.3% of adult population of Itajaí (113,845) had participated on the
143 ivermectin program. The under-reporting of hospitalisations and deaths cannot be attributed
144 to the reported ivermectin effects claimed by KC22.

145 To further understand this issue, we compared the dates of symptom onset for all adult

A: All uniquely mapped hospitalised KC22 study subjects, unstratified.

	non-user ¹	IVM user ¹	p-value ²
All Brazilian Health Ministry-mapped individuals (138 total)			<0.001
Covid onset on or after 7 July 2020	41 (59%)	62 (91%)	
Covid onset prior to 7 July 2020	29 (41%)	6 (8.8%)	

¹n (%)

²Fisher's exact test

B: Subgroup analysis of uniquely mapped KC22 hospitalised study subjects, stratified by Covid-19 death outcome.

	non-user ¹	IVM user ¹	p-value ²
Alive (49)			0.092
Covid onset on or after 7 July 2020	13 (62%)	24 (86%)	
Covid onset prior to 7 July 2020	8 (38%)	4 (14%)	
Dead (89)			<0.001
Covid onset on or after 7 July 2020	28 (57%)	38 (95%)	
Covid onset prior to 7 July 2020	21 (43%)	2 (5.0%)	

¹n (%)

²Fisher's exact test

Table 1. Mistaken inclusion of pre-study infections in the non-user group. KC22 study participants uniquely mapped with Brazil Health Ministry (SUS) individuals as described in the text. Parts (a) and (b) show overall and subgroup analysis, respectively.

146 Itajaí residents hospitalised for COVID-19 (obtained from the SUS records, Fig. 1A) to the onset




Figure 1. Symptom onset and study group allocation. A. All official Brazilian Health Ministry entries for hospitalised adult residents of Itajaí. B. The 134 individuals mapped to the SUS data from KC22. C. The probability of an individual considered in the study being allocated to the non-user group changes dramatically over time during the allocation of participants in KC22.

147 dates of the 138 individuals uniquely mapped to hospitalisations in KC22 (Fig. 1B). Strikingly,
148 the KC22 data not only mistakenly included hospitalised individuals with symptom onset *before*
149 the study period, but almost all of the remaining matched hospitalised individuals experienced
150 symptom onset *in the first half* of the study period. KC22 entirely neglected the second wave
151 of COVID hospitalisations, which peaked at the end of study period.

152 **Enrolment to the ivermectin program continued during the study period**

153 Both KC22 and KB22 compared events between adult residents of Itajaí who did or did not
154 participate in the ivermectin program over the entire study period. KC22 claimed “This strict
155 interval avoids differences in terms of periods of exposure”. We definitely disagree: not all
156 113,845 participants received ivermectin exactly on July 7, 2020. Consider an individual who
157 reported symptoms on July 8, but had not yet joined the ivermectin distribution program. That
158 individual would be ineligible for inclusion in the KC22 study as an ivermectin user, but would
159 instead be treated in the analysis of KC22 as an infected non-user. The biased allocation of
160 new infections into the non-user group would continue for as long as the distribution program
161 enrolled new participants (Fig. 1C). This alone is a classic case of immortal time bias [16], but
162 because the most rapid enrolment occurred during the peak infection period in July 2020, it
163 also coincides with substantial chronological bias [17]. To distinguish these two sources of
164 bias during the enrolment period with other sources of bias described later, we refer them
165 collectively as “enrolment bias”.

166 **Enrolment bias, incorrect inclusion of already infected participants, and biased 167 sampling towards the beginning of the study led to large apparent protection 168 against infection, hospitalisation, and death in KC22**

169 We replicated the KC22 study using Monte Carlo simulations under the assumption of no iver-
170 mectin effect to assess the impact of the enrolment bias, the incorrect inclusion of subjects
171 with symptomatic onset prior to the study, and the biased sampling towards the beginning of
172 the study. We simulated symptom onset in individual patient data cohorts each the size of the
173 data set in KC22. To simulate the dates of symptom onset, we used daily Itajaí notifications of
174 infection from the Brazil Health Ministry. To simulate enrolment over time, we used contempo-
175 raneous local news reports of program enrolment for participants and assumed participants
176 began taking ivermectin immediately.

177 We developed multiple models to estimate the individual and cumulative effects of the iden-
178 tified biases and errors. Each model incorporated 7231 infections within a cohort of 159,560
179 individuals (infection rate of approximately 4.5%). Additionally, we simulated hospitalisations
180 and deaths to match KC22 totals, using dates sampled from the Brazil Health Ministry records,
181 as detailed in the Methods and Materials section. Results are reported based on 1000 simula-
182 tions of each model and compared to reported values from KC22. Hospitalisations and deaths
183 reported among infected individuals and compared to the infected individuals from KC22 prior
184 to propensity score matching.

185 The enrolment bias present in KC22 leads to an estimated fictitious risk reduction for infec-
186 tion of 18% for users of an ineffective medicine. This result stems from our first model (i-ENR),
187 in which we randomly sampled infections from the distribution of onset dates between July 7
188 and December 2, 2020.

189 In addition to the enrolment bias, the incorrect inclusion of subjects with symptomatic on-
190 set prior to the study period leads to an additional 12% fictitious risk reduction for infection. In
191 our second model (i-INF), we simulated incorrect inclusion by sampling from symptom onset
192 dates where the notification date was between July 7 – December 2, 2020. The i-INF model
193 thus encompassed both enrolment bias and the mistaken inclusion of early infections.

194 Lastly, an additional 13% fictitious risk reduction for infection is caused by the biased sam-
195 pling towards the beginning of study observed in KC22. In the third model family (i-KC22), we
196 mimicked the observation of sampling bias in Fig. 1B by sampling infections strictly from infec-
197 tion dates of matched individuals, or sampling using a smoothed estimator (developed from
198 the empirical data) of the chance of recording symptom in the study. Details of these models

		Simulation				Literature
		i-NEG	i-ENR	i-INF	i-KC22	KC22 [7]
has enrolment bias			✓	✓	✓	✓
includes prior infections				✓	✓	✓
has missing data					✓	✓
Infection						
rate	non-user	4.53%	5.20%	5.78%	6.54%	6.64%
rate	user	4.53%	4.26%	4.03%	3.72%	3.69%
Risk ratio			0.82	0.70	0.57	0.56
95% CI			[0.78–0.86]	[0.67–0.73]	[0.54–0.60]	[0.53–0.58]
p value ¹			<0.001	<0.001	<0.001	<0.001
risk reduction			18%	30%	43%	44%
Hospitalisation²						
rate	non-user	2.56%	2.76%	2.97%	3.49%	3.26%
rate	user	2.56%	2.46%	2.32%	1.90%	2.05%
Risk ratio			0.89	0.78	0.54	0.63
95% CI			[0.66–1.20]	[0.59–1.04]	[0.41–0.72]	[0.47–0.84]
p value ¹			0.384	0.103	<0.001	0.001
risk reduction			11%	22%	46%	37%
Death²						
rate	non-user	1.95%	2.21%	2.37%	2.87%	2.60%
rate	user	1.95%	1.82%	1.71%	1.52%	1.48%
Risk ratio			0.82	0.72	0.53	0.57
95% CI			[0.59–1.16]	[0.52–1.00]	[0.39–0.73]	[0.41–0.79]
p value ¹			0.276	0.052	<0.001	0.001
risk reduction			18%	28%	47%	43%

¹Wald test

²Reported among 7231 infected individuals per cohort.

Table 2. Apparent protection provided by biases and errors in KC22. Apparent protection against infection, hospitalisation, and death due to enrolment bias, mistaken inclusion of prior infections, and missing data. Comparisons are between users and non-users, as defined in KC22. Three different simulation strategies were used to simulate the isolated effects of biases identified in [7] along with a negative control (i-NEG). Hospitalisation and death statistics are reported among infected individuals. i-KC22 and the published KC22 data set include all three biases. Simulations are as described in the text.

199 (which give similar results) are discussed in the methods. The i-KC22 model family most closely
200 matched the errors and biases so far discussed in KC22.

201 The results of the models, alongside the published results of KC22 and a trivial negative
202 model (i-NEG, with neither ivermectin effect nor any biases) are shown in Table 2. Each source
203 of bias reduced the apparent incident rates of infection, hospitalisation, and death of iver-
204 mectin users and, hence, increased the apparent risk reduction of the exposure. Biases in
205 the design and execution of KC22 account for *all* of the reported protection attributed to iver-
206 mectin.

207 The estimated effect of enrolment bias in the i-ENR model is conservative, since we as-
208 sumed optimistically that news reporting was accurate and that ivermectin use began imme-
209 diately for all participants. While we have direct evidence for the temporal-biased sampling
210 in the case of hospitalisation and death, the effect of temporal sampling bias for infections in
211 i-KC22 is indirectly estimated based on assumed consistency with hospitalisations and deaths.
212 Full details of the simulation methods are found in the Methods and in the GitHub repository
213 accompanying this paper.

214 **KC22 hospitalisation and mortality results included attrition bias by design**

215 COVID-19 outcome events occur in sequence: hospitalisation usually precedes COVID-19
216 death; COVID-19 infection always precedes COVID-19 hospitalisation and COVID-19 death.
217 KC22 stated they had included “all events” from July 7 – December 2, 2020, so hospitalisations
218 and deaths *after* the study period following infections *during* the study period were ignored.
219 This would not necessarily introduce additional bias if the allocation of ivermectin users and
220 non-users had been balanced. However, the enrolment bias previously described leads not
221 just to a fictitious benefit from treatment, but to a difference between exposure groups in the
222 distribution of infections over time: non-user infections accumulate earlier in the study period,
223 and infections among users accumulate later. Indeed, the median infection date for the non-
224 user group over 1000 simulations was September 4, 2020, while that for the user group was
225 October 2, almost a month later.

226 The enrolment bias in recorded infections thus leads to additional bias due to attrition for
227 later hospitalisations and deaths [18, 19]. As shown in Table 3, the KC22 study design under-
228 counted hospitalisations and deaths among ivermectin users, because those individuals were
229 enrolled over time while event counting was stopped at a fixed date. This became especially
230 prominent when we added the temporal-biased sampling observed in Fig. 1B in the i-KC22
231 model, as shown in Table 3B.

232 Fig. 2 illustrates the basis of this finding in detail. In KC22, infections tended to occur earlier
233 in the non-user group because of the delayed enrolment in the user group and the July 2020
234 infection peak (Fig. 2A). Death events after the follow-up period are lost to attrition as a rule in
235 any given cohort, but this attrition is more likely among users than non-users in KC22, as shown
236 for a single simulated cohort in Fig. 2B. A higher percentage of deaths than hospitalisations
237 are lost to attrition in both groups (Fig. 2C) but the ivermectin user group is more likely to
238 have uncounted hospitalisations and deaths than the non-user group. This translates to an
239 increased risk of attrition in the ivermectin group, a relative risk that is higher for deaths than
240 for hospitalisations (Fig. 2D).

241 Unattributed bias and sampling errors thus account for roughly all of the reported protec-
242 tion against hospitalisation and death among infected individuals in KC22.

243 **The “regular ivermectin user” distinction in KB22 created additional immortal 244 time bias**

245 We now turn to the second paper from the Itajaí study (KB22), which considered the “regular
246 use” of ivermectin. Because actual ivermectin use was not measured, KB22 treated the re-
247 turn to collect medication over time as a surrogate measure for the actual ivermectin intake.
248 KB22 further subdivided ivermectin users into exposure groups based on the total amount of
249 medication distributed: regular users (those who had received at least thirty 6 mg ivermectin
250 tablets, or 180 mg total), irregular users (those who had received no more than 10 tablets), and

A: i-ENR model (1000 simulations)

outcome	exposure	risk ratio	(95% CI)	p value ¹	outcome rate
hospitalisation	non-user	1			2.8%
	user	0.87	(0.65–1.17)	0.34	2.4%
death	non-user	1			2.3%
	user	0.79	(0.57–1.11)	0.18	1.8%

¹Wald test

B: i-KC22 model (1000 simulations)

outcome	exposure	risk ratio	(95% CI)	p value	outcome rate
hospitalisation	non-user	1			3.4%
	user	0.56	(0.42–0.74)	<0.0001	1.9%
death	non-user	1			2.7%
	user	0.51	(0.36–0.71)	<0.0001	1.4%

C: KC22 pre-matching (from [7], table 6)

outcome	exposure	risk ratio	(95% CI)	p value	outcome rate
hospitalisation	non-user	1			3.3%
	user	0.61	(0.46–0.81)	0.0007	2.0%
death	non-user	1			2.6%
	user	0.55	(0.040–0.77)	0.0004	1.4%

Table 3. Attrition bias provides apparent protection against hospitalisation and death. A. 1000 runs of i-ENR model, restricted to infected individuals. B. 1000 runs of i-KC22 model, restricted to infected individuals. C. Results as reported in KC22, table 6.

251 non-users. According to KC22, newly diagnosed COVID-19 patients were recommended “not
 252 to use ivermectin” and that “The city did not provide or support any specific pharmacological
 253 outpatient treatment for subjects infected with COVID-19”. The citywide ivermectin program
 254 was, as KC22 and KB22 made clear, the use of ivermectin as a prophylactic for COVID-19, not
 255 as a treatment.

256 The central claim of KB22 was a dose-response relationship between ivermectin use and
 257 protection from infection, hospitalisation, and death. The exposure groups in KB22, however,
 258 were assigned *retrospectively* based on the amount of medication distributed over time. More-
 259 over, both the language of KC22 and contemporary news reports suggest that users would
 260 have stopped ivermectin use upon infection, but the analysis of KB22 assumes the opposite,
 261 treating ivermectin usage as an independent variable.

262 How long would someone have to take ivermectin to be classified as a regular user in KB22?
 263 The maximum dosage in the Itajaí program was 4 tablets a day for two days, or 8 tablets every
 264 15 days from day 2 of usage. This would require a minimum of 46 days after enrolment to
 265 be classified as a regular user. The more typical 3-tablet dosage would require 61 days. This
 266 entire time period is “immortal” time for regular users who stopped ivermectin use upon infec-
 267 tion: infections during that time period would result in their allocation to other groups and an
 268 apparent reduction of the infection rate in regular users.

269 We simulated the effects of these biases by randomly allocating intended usage among iver-
 270 mectin users using the total tablet distribution from KC22 data, and truncating to simulated
 271 actual usage based on how long an individual participated in the study without infection. We
 272 assumed a body weight between 60-90 kg, so 3 tablets per day of use. Because actual changes
 273 in usage upon infection are unknown, we considered two distinct scenarios. In the first, deter-




Figure 2. Attrition bias in hospitalisations and deaths in KC22 stemmed from enrolment bias. A. Empirical distributions of simulated infection dates over 1000 runs of the i-ENR model. Note the delayed early peak of infections in the ivermectin user group. B. Example from one typical simulation of uncounted deaths among ivermectin users. Each line segment represents an individual in the simulation who was infected and later died, with infection and death dates at the end points. The study end date is marked with a vertical line. C. Hospitalisations and deaths are lost to attrition more frequently in the user group (1000 simulations of the i-ENR model). D. The relative risk of attrition in the ivermectin user group over 1000 simulations (the horizontal line shows a relative risk of 1).

274 ministic, scenario, all infected users stopped ivermectin upon infection. In the second, proba-
 275 bilistic, scenario, we used the regularity groupings of KB22 as a proxy for commitment: regular
 276 users receiving ≥ 30 tablets would stop on infection with a probability of 5%, irregular users
 277 would stop with a probability of 30%. As there is no evidence that ivermectin was offered to
 278 COVID-19 inpatients at the time, all users would stop taking ivermectin on hospitalisation.

279 In both scenarios, the immortal time bias leads to a strong fictitious dose-response rela-
 280 tionship under the assumption of ineffective medicine. In the deterministic stopping scenario
 281 the dose-response relationship was even stronger than reported in KB22. In the probabilistic
 282 setting, which models a very small change in user behaviour upon infection, our simulations
 283 closely match the dose-response relationship found in KB22 (see Table 4).

284 Discussion

285 Re-analysis of the data shows no benefit from ivermectin use on infections, hos- 286 pitalisations, or death

287 A comparison between the key findings in KC22 and KB22 and our re-analysis is found in Ta-
 288 ble 4. The apparent risk reduction from documented artefacts — including well-known biases
 289 and sampling errors — accounts for all of the reported benefits of ivermectin claimed in both
 290 KC22 and KB22. As the key findings from Table 4 underlie all subsequent analyses in KC22 and
 291 KB22, none of the results reported in either paper holds up to scrutiny.

292 The errors are pervasive. Should they have been obvious?

293 The biases and failings in KC22 and KB22 originate from a mix of sources. Some biases (such
 294 as the immortal time bias during enrolment and the KB22-specific immortal time bias from the

Immortal time bias protection of infected 'regular' users




Figure 3. KB22's "regular" use group [8] created more immortal time bias. A. Simulated dates of hospitalisation in i-ENR for individuals grouped by exposure according to KB22-defined usage groups. The study end date is marked with a vertical line. B. Dates of death. C. Relative risk of hospitalisation and death for "regular" ivermectin users compared to "irregular" and non-users. Risk ratios are calculated and plotted for each of 1000 simulations. Dates of hospitalisation and death are shown for all individuals across 1000 simulations.

Summary statistics	Simulation				KB22/KC22				KB22/KC22 corrected for documented biases and errors			
	RR ¹	95% CI	Risk Red.	p.val	RR ¹	95% CI	Risk Red.	p.val	RR ¹	95% CI	Risk Red.	p.val
Infection												
non-user vs user	0.57	0.54–0.60	43%	<0.001	0.56	0.53–0.58	44%	<0.001	0.98	0.91–1.04	2%	0.222
non-user vs irregular	0.71	0.67–0.76	29%	<0.001	0.68	0.64–0.73	32%	<0.001	0.96	0.88–1.04	4%	0.165
non-user vs regular	0.42	0.37–0.48	58%	<0.001	0.51	0.45–0.57	49%	<0.001	1.22	1.02–1.46	-22%	0.984
irregular vs regular	0.59	0.51–0.68	41%	<0.001	0.75	0.66–0.84	25%	<0.001	1.27	1.05–1.53	-27%	0.994
Hospitalisation												
non-user vs user	0.54	0.41–0.73	46%	<0.001	0.63	0.47–0.83	37%	0.001	1.15	0.77–1.74	-15%	0.755
non-user vs irregular	0.99	0.71–1.36	1%	0.551	0.76	0.50–1.06	24%	0.143	0.76	0.46–1.24	24%	0.134
non-user vs regular	0.00	0.00–0.00	100%	0.001	0.00	0.00–0.00	100%	<0.001	NA ²	NA ²	NA ²	NA ²
irregular vs regular	0.00	0.00–0.00	100%	0.002	0.00	0.00–0.00	100%	0.003	NA ²	NA ²	NA ²	NA ²
Death												
non-user vs user	0.53	0.38–0.73	47%	<0.001	0.57	0.40–0.79	43%	<0.001	1.07	0.67–1.70	-7%	0.609
non-user vs irregular	1.00	0.69–1.41	0%	0.522	0.72	0.45–1.08	28%	0.149	0.72	0.41–1.25	28%	0.122
non-user vs regular	0.00	0.00–0.00	100%	0.004	0.27	0.00–0.73	73%	0.044	>1.0 ³	NA ³	<0% ³	NA ³
irregular vs regular	0.00	0.00–0.00	100%	0.005	0.38	0.00–1.09	62%	0.212	>1.0 ³	NA ³	<0% ³	NA ³

Table 4. Statistical biases and errors account for all effects of ivermectin for Covid-19 reported in KC22 and KB22. This is the iKC22 model with probabilistic stop on infection, including a stop probability of 0.3 (for irregular users) and 0.05 (for regular users). Details of the this and other models are described in the text. Results of all models are reported in the supplementary tables. ¹Risk Ratio. ²Experiment artefacts cause a 100% risk reduction, which precludes any estimation of the effect of ivermectin in the KB22 and KC22 experimental setup for this outcome. ³Simulations showing 100% risk reduction preclude estimation of confidence intervals and p values after correction, but suggest that the artifacts account for at least all the observed benefit.

295 definition of "regular users") stem from the study design itself. These biases should be evident,
 296 immediately or after some thought, to any scientific or medical professional with training and
 297 experience in study design. The attrition bias in hospitalisations and deaths that is magnified
 298 by enrolment bias is perhaps less self-evident, but can still be understood from first principles.
 299 Understanding other sources of bias in KC22 and KB22 requires data. To appreciate the
 300 chronological bias during enrolment, for example, one must at least be aware of public data
 301 such as reported case rates over time. Still other issues, such as the pervasive sampling biases

302 detailed above, require careful examination, cross-tabulation, and analysis of available data to
303 identify the extent of particular issues.

304 Another evident bias in KC22 and KB22, not addressed by our analysis, is their complete lack
305 of attention to health inequity. This is hard to fathom given the likelihood of socioeconomic
306 differences between participants and non-participants. Participation in the Itajaí program re-
307 quired individuals to take proactive steps: they needed to travel to distribution centres, sign
308 up for the program, register their information, receive medication, and return periodically for
309 medication refills. KC22 and KB22 included known *prognostic* factors in propensity score match-
310 ing after infection. However, neither KC22 nor KB22 accounted for any socioeconomic factors
311 as potential covariates affecting either infection risk or prognosis, even though impoverished
312 and vulnerable populations are known to have higher risk and worse outcomes for many dis-
313 eases and to be harder to reach and recruit for clinical studies [20, 21]. These well-known
314 inequities were magnified during the early phases of COVID-19 because of stresses in public
315 health systems [22–25]. Furthermore, health inequity — including during the COVID-19 pan-
316 demic — is an area of active study in Brazil, with greater risk of hospitalisation and death from
317 social inequity and disadvantage [26–28].

318 While some of the issues we identified (such as those apparently arising from incomplete
319 data and sampling errors) might escape even a rigorous review process, other issues (such as
320 the multiple sources of immortal time bias) arise from the study design itself. In our view, these
321 issues should have been recognised and addressed by the authors, and they should have been
322 recognised and questioned by the reviewers.

323 They were not. Instead, each paper was submitted, revised, and accepted in a matter of
324 days, and immediately entered public discussion with a primary focus on the large size of the
325 study population and the large magnitude of reported risk reduction, as if a large reported
326 risk reduction must be true if the study itself is large. Unfortunately the opposite may hold if a
327 study is built on a fallacious design. In such a case both the reported treatment effect and the
328 apparent confidence (especially when reported as “statistical significance”) may increase with
329 a larger study population [29–31], even if there is no actual effect of treatment. This appears
330 to be the situation with KC22 and KB22.

331 **The growing consensus and persistent divide on use of ivermectin for Covid-19**

332 Ivermectin has been known to have different mechanisms in vertebrates and nematodes for
333 over 30 years [32]. Ivermectin’s mechanism and safety as an antihelmintic stems from its po-
334 tent targeting of glutamate-gated chloride channel receptors essential for nematodes but not
335 found in vertebrates [33]. When ivermectin was first suggested based on *in vitro* experiments
336 as a potential anti-viral treatment for COVID-19 [4], it was not altogether unreasonable: some
337 of the same researchers had reported a possible antiviral mechanism through nuclear $\alpha/\beta 1$
338 importin complex [34, 35]. However, those studies were undertaken in cell lines such as Vero
339 E6 or Hela (both widely used for viral assays); when careful comparison studies were carried
340 out in more relevant human bronchial epithelial cells, ivermectin had no effect on SARS-CoV-2
341 replication [36]. There were other reasons to be sceptical of the initial enthusiasm; the well-
342 studied pharmacokinetics and pharmacodynamics of ivermectin suggested that it would be
343 impossible to replicate in humans the concentrations required for *in vitro* activity [37, 38].

344 As in Itajaí, some doctors began prescribing ivermectin based on preliminary studies; most
345 mainstream public health authorities encouraged clinical trials. As a result, hundreds of stud-
346 ies of ivermectin for COVID-19 have been published in the last three years, including dozens of
347 clinical trials, numerous cell biology and biochemical studies, mechanistic speculation based
348 on molecular docking, and competing reviews. Some of the earliest high-profile studies report-
349 ing large effects of ivermectin have been retracted or otherwise flagged for ethical concerns
350 [39, 40]. Meta-analyses that included such flawed analysis have also been retracted [41] and
351 reviews advocating for the immediate use of ivermectin [42] have been criticised as deeply
352 problematic [43]. One possible lesson from both ivermectin meta-analysis and vaccine clinical
353 trials is to require individual patient data, rather than summary data alone, for assessment of
354 bias in meta-analysis [44, 45].

355 While rigorous randomised clinical trials have largely not found clinical benefit for iver-
356 mectin use in COVID-19 [46–49], and there is strong and growing scientific and clinical consen-
357 sus against its clinical use for COVID-19 treatment or prophylaxis [50], this consensus is persis-
358 tently rejected by ivermectin advocates. Regional, national, and international organisations¹
359 have sprung up to advocate for ivermectin and other non-proven treatments for COVID-19, and
360 strive to influence public opinion. Ivermectin-for-COVID advocacy groups maintain their posi-
361 tion and influence through mechanisms including promoting “science by preprint”, exploiting
362 perfunctory peer review, aggressively using social media, and cultivating socio-political alliances
363 including the anti-vaccination movement. Observational studies are particularly vulnerable to
364 misinterpretation and use as misinformation.

365 **The use of simulation to solve statistical fallacies**

366 Statistical fallacies or ‘statistical lies’ affect our lives in many ways: we read them in newspapers,
367 we hear them in conversation, we inadvertently make them ourselves, and they are unfortu-
368 nately common in science. The fallacies often go hand-in-hand with cognitive heuristics that
369 bias our perception of reality [51]. For instance, salience bias (the tendency to focus on remark-
370 able events or prominent features) leads people to overestimate risk of rare events and make
371 decisions that appear irrational and incur a cost to themselves and to society [52, 53].

372 Despite the review process, biases and statistical fallacies also arise in scientific literature
373 [19, 54], and proliferation of these fallacies carries the potential for disaster: the incorrect
374 conclusions of KC22 and KB22 for instance, were used to support arguments that ivermectin
375 was at least as effective as vaccination against COVID-19 related death, potentially increasing
376 vaccine hesitancy and thereby increasing the global death toll due to COVID-19.

377 One of the most famous statistical fallacies is seen in the Monty Hall problem, named for the
378 original host of the American television show “Let’s Make a Deal”, where a variant of this puzzle
379 appeared in every episode. In this puzzle, a player is presented three closed doors and asked
380 to choose one. Behind one of these doors is a prize which the player will win if they choose
381 the correct door. Once the player has chosen a door, the host reveals which of the other two
382 doors does not contain the prize, and subsequently asks the player if they would like to stick
383 with their initial choice or switch to the other closed door. When presented for the first time,
384 most people assume that switching their choice will not affect the likelihood of winning a prize
385 [55] The answer, however² is that the likelihood of winning a prize after switching is two thirds,
386 whereas the likelihood of winning is only one third when the participant doesn’t switch doors.

387 Remarkably, even when people are shown explanations, simulations and mathematical
388 proofs, many - including renown statisticians - still refuse to accept the answer of the puzzle [55,
389 56]. Studies using repeated simulations of the Monte Hall problem show a remarkable adop-
390 tion of the correct answer. Herein participants play the game over and over on the computer,
391 and get feedback on how often they won the prize. The Monte Carlo simulation that we use
392 here is basically an automation of this process. Akin to the Monte Hall problem, researchers
393 may falsely reason that it is correct to include participants that got infected by COVID-19 before
394 registering/consuming ivermectin as non-users in a rolling registration context. But simulating
395 the process unveils that an artificial efficacy emerges for the treatment group. We hope there-
396 fore that our work extends beyond a correction of these two papers, and helps researchers of
397 observational trials in general not to repeat these fallacies.

398 **Methods and materials**

399 **Starting data**

400 We used data made available by the authors of KC22 at DOI 10.17605/OSF.IO/UXHAF. This data
401 was missing critical information, which we addressed as follows. City-wide monthly infections
402 and deaths were taken from [43], which in turn obtained them from the Brazilian Health Min-
403 istry. We also used the Brazilian Health Ministry resource to obtain national reporting data

¹These include the Front Line COVID-19 Critical Care Alliance (FLCCC), America’s Frontline Doctors, and the World Council for Health

²in the simplest case, assuming that the host always opens the wrong door and always gives the player a choice to switch

404 for individuals including dates of symptom onset, hospitalisation, and death, though this was
405 largely limited to hospitalised patients during the time of the study. We downloaded this data
406 on 26 September 2022. While the study began enrolling participants on July 7, 2020, the KC22
407 data does not indicate when any individual patient joined the program and was provided iver-
408 mectin. We used an estimate of program enrolment over time by following news articles in the
409 local Itajaí press (e.g. [57]). Sources for each estimate are in the GitHub repository.

410 **Analysis of overlap between KC22 and Brazilian Health Ministry data**

411 Data from KC22 was cross-tabulated with public data from the Brazilian Health Ministry. Af-
412 ter identifying variables that were available in both data sets, we identified matches between
413 infected individuals (both users and non-users) from KC22 and infected individuals from the
414 health ministry data. Matches were counted only if they were identical for all of the variables
415 considered (birth date, hospitalisation status, sex, and death outcome). A few entries in KC22
416 had more than one match to the health ministry data, which could be due to data errors or
417 multiple infections. We included the match with the latest date of symptom onset in order to
418 avoid over-counting pre-study inclusion in KC22.

419 **Allocation to exposure and outcome groups**

420 For each simulation experiment, repeated Bernoulli trials are conducted for each of the
421 159,560 individuals to assign them to exposure groups (users or non users) as well as out-
422 comes (infections, hospitalisations, deaths). Hospitalisation was always preceded by infection,
423 and death was always preceded by hospitalisation. All allocation probabilities were fixed based
424 on the number of users, non-users, infections, hospitalisations, and deaths reported in KC22
425 (e.g. probability to be an ivermectin user is $113,844 / 159,560$).

426 **Simulation of event times and ivermectin usage**

427 For each simulated individual that contracted COVID-19, was hospitalised, or died, the event
428 date was sampled from the empirical distributions of official government records. In the case
429 of missing data, we used complete cases to confirm published reports that time periods in the
430 progression of COVID-19 were well-approximated by a Weibull distribution [58–60], and then
431 created an objective function using the empirical mean and standard deviation of time delays
432 to numerically optimise the Weibull scale and shape parameters to impute missing event dates.

433 Intended ivermectin usage was truncated to actual usage as follows. In probabilistic trunca-
434 tion, infected users with high intended usage (≥ 30 pills) were less likely ($p = 0.1$) to stop usage
435 on infection than those with lower intended usage ($p = 0.5$). In deterministic truncation, all in-
436 fected users stopped ivermectin use upon infection. In all cases, infected users stopped upon
437 hospitalisation. Ivermectin users were split into irregular (≤ 10 pills) and regular users (≥ 30
438 pills) based on simulated actual usage.

439 **Calculation of simulated estimates**

440 Risk ratios were calculated using unconditional maximum likelihood (Wald statistic), while con-
441 fidence intervals and p values estimated from 10,000 bootstraps using the `riskratio.boot`
442 function from the `epitools` package in R [61]. Summary statistics from KC22 and KB22 were
443 reestimated the same way for consistency. For summary statistics after correction, we as-
444 sumed any true effects of ivermectin were independent of apparent effects from artefacts
445 and errors. Risk ratios, confidence intervals, and p values after correction were calculated by
446 10,000 bootstraps of simulated and reported data for each simulation.

447 **Data and code availability**

448 All data is publicly available at either DOI 10.17605/OSF.IO/UXHAF (posted by Kerr et
449 al), the Brazil Ministry of Health (<https://www.gov.br/saude/pt-br>), or Our World in Data
450 (<https://ourworldindata.org/COVID-cases>). R code to reproduce the analysis is available at
451 <https://github.com/gtuckerkellogg/itajai-reanalysis>.

452 Author contributions

453 RM conducted the research required to uncover all fallacies mentioned in the manuscript (de-
454 layed registrations, missing data, incorrect inclusion of prior infections, all biases). GTK inde-
455 pendently uncovered the immortal time bias, enrolment bias, and attrition bias. RM and GTK
456 wrote the simulation and analysis code. GTK in particular, RM, and ACPA contributed to writ-
457 ing and reviewing the manuscript. ACPA acquired the data from the Brazilian Health Ministry.
458 ACPA has been in frequent contact with Itajaí City Hall in an attempt to get access to missing
459 raw data. RM has been in frequent contact with the KC22 and KB22 authors in an attempt to
460 discuss the issues in their work before publishing this manuscript.

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635 **Appendix**
636 **i-ENR model simulations**

Summary statistics	Simulation				KB22/KC22			
	RR	95% CI	Risk Red.	p.val	RR	95% CI	Risk Red.	p.val
Infection								
non-user vs user	0.83	0.80–0.88	17%	<0.001	0.56	0.53–0.58	44%	<0.001
non-user vs irregular	0.94	0.88–1.00	6%	0.052	0.68	0.64–0.72	32%	<0.001
non-user vs regular	0.72	0.64–0.81	28%	<0.001	0.51	0.45–0.57	49%	<0.001
irregular vs regular	0.77	0.68–0.86	23%	<0.001	0.75	0.66–0.85	25%	<0.001
Hospitalisation								
non-user vs user	0.88	0.66–1.20	12%	0.343	0.63	0.47–0.83	37%	0.001
non-user vs irregular	1.23	0.86–1.74	-23%	0.254	0.76	0.50–1.07	24%	0.143
non-user vs regular	0.45	0.10–1.01	55%	0.152	0.00	0.00–0.00	100%	<0.001
irregular vs regular	0.37	0.08–0.83	63%	0.051	0.00	0.00–0.00	100%	0.003
Death								
non-user vs user	0.81	0.58–1.16	19%	0.238	0.57	0.41–0.79	43%	<0.001
non-user vs irregular	1.26	0.84–1.87	-26%	0.252	0.72	0.45–1.09	28%	0.149
non-user vs regular	0.30	0.00–0.82	70%	0.082	0.27	0.00–0.73	73%	0.044
irregular vs regular	0.24	0.00–0.67	76%	0.027	0.38	0.00–1.05	62%	0.212

Table S1. i-ENR model with probabilistic stop on infection. Stop probability: 0.30 (irregular), 0.05 (regular). Statistics for hospitalisations and deaths are limited to infected individuals.

Summary statistics	Simulation				KB22/KC22			
	RR	95% CI	Risk Red.	p.val	RR	95% CI	Risk Red.	p.val
Infection								
non-user vs user	0.83	0.80–0.88	17%	<0.001	0.56	0.53–0.58	44%	<0.001
non-user vs irregular	0.94	0.88–1.00	6%	0.052	0.68	0.64–0.73	32%	<0.001
non-user vs regular	0.72	0.64–0.81	28%	<0.001	0.51	0.45–0.58	49%	<0.001
irregular vs regular	0.77	0.68–0.86	23%	<0.001	0.75	0.66–0.84	25%	<0.001
Hospitalisation								
non-user vs user	0.72	0.54–1.00	28%	0.042	0.35	0.26–0.46	65%	<0.001
non-user vs irregular	1.16	0.80–1.66	-16%	0.369	0.52	0.34–0.74	48%	<0.001
non-user vs regular	0.33	0.07–0.73	67%	0.028	0.00	0.00–0.00	100%	<0.001
irregular vs regular	0.29	0.06–0.64	71%	0.009	0.00	0.00–0.00	100%	<0.001
Death								
non-user vs user	0.69	0.49–0.98	31%	0.040	0.32	0.22–0.44	68%	<0.001
non-user vs irregular	1.18	0.79–1.77	-18%	0.366	0.49	0.31–0.75	51%	<0.001
non-user vs regular	0.22	0.00–0.60	78%	0.014	0.14	0.00–0.38	86%	<0.001
irregular vs regular	0.18	0.00–0.51	82%	0.005	0.28	0.00–0.82	72%	0.070

Table S2. i-ENR model with probabilistic stop on infection. Stop probability: 0.30 (irregular), 0.05 (regular). Statistics for hospitalisations and deaths are reported for all individuals in the cohort.

Summary statistics	Simulation				KB22/KC22			
	RR	95% CI	Risk Red.	p.val	RR	95% CI	Risk Red.	p.val
Infection								
non-user vs user	0.83	0.80–0.88	17%	<0.001	0.56	0.53–0.58	44%	<0.001
non-user vs irregular	1.18	1.11–1.25	-18%	<0.001	0.68	0.64–0.73	32%	<0.001
non-user vs regular	0.45	0.39–0.52	55%	<0.001	0.51	0.45–0.57	49%	<0.001
irregular vs regular	0.38	0.33–0.44	62%	<0.001	0.75	0.65–0.84	25%	<0.001
Hospitalisation								
non-user vs user	0.88	0.66–1.19	12%	0.343	0.63	0.47–0.84	37%	0.001
non-user vs irregular	1.03	0.73–1.46	-3%	0.522	0.76	0.50–1.09	24%	0.143
non-user vs regular	0.71	0.15–1.59	29%	0.517	0.00	0.00–0.00	100%	<0.001
irregular vs regular	0.70	0.15–1.55	30%	0.486	0.00	0.00–0.00	100%	0.003
Death								
non-user vs user	0.81	0.58–1.16	19%	0.238	0.57	0.40–0.79	43%	<0.001
non-user vs irregular	1.08	0.73–1.60	-8%	0.484	0.72	0.45–1.08	28%	0.149
non-user vs regular	0.46	0.00–1.27	54%	0.429	0.27	0.00–0.72	73%	0.044
irregular vs regular	0.44	0.00–1.18	56%	0.318	0.38	0.00–1.09	62%	0.212

Table S3. i-ENR model with uniform stop on infection. Stop probability: 1.0 (all individuals). Statistics for hospitalisations and deaths are limited to infected individuals.

Summary statistics	Simulation				KB22/KC22			
	RR	95% CI	Risk Red.	p.val	RR	95% CI	Risk Red.	p.val
Infection								
non-user vs user	0.83	0.80–0.88	17%	<0.001	0.56	0.53–0.58	44%	<0.001
non-user vs irregular	1.18	1.11–1.25	-18%	<0.001	0.68	0.64–0.72	32%	<0.001
non-user vs regular	0.45	0.39–0.52	55%	<0.001	0.51	0.45–0.58	49%	<0.001
irregular vs regular	0.38	0.33–0.44	62%	<0.001	0.75	0.66–0.85	25%	<0.001
Hospitalisation								
non-user vs user	0.72	0.54–1.00	28%	0.042	0.35	0.26–0.46	65%	<0.001
non-user vs irregular	1.22	0.85–1.74	-22%	0.262	0.52	0.35–0.74	48%	<0.001
non-user vs regular	0.33	0.07–0.73	67%	0.027	0.00	0.00–0.00	100%	<0.001
irregular vs regular	0.27	0.06–0.60	73%	0.004	0.00	0.00–0.00	100%	<0.001
Death								
non-user vs user	0.69	0.49–0.98	31%	0.040	0.32	0.22–0.44	68%	<0.001
non-user vs irregular	1.28	0.86–1.90	-28%	0.224	0.49	0.31–0.74	51%	<0.001
non-user vs regular	0.22	0.00–0.59	78%	0.014	0.14	0.00–0.37	86%	<0.001
irregular vs regular	0.16	0.00–0.45	84%	0.002	0.28	0.00–0.79	72%	0.070

Table S4. i-ENR model with uniform stop on infection. Stop probability: 1.0 (all individuals). Statistics for hospitalisations and deaths are reported for all individuals in the cohort.

637 **i-INF model simulations**

Summary statistics	Simulation				KB22/KC22			
	RR	95% CI	Risk Red.	p.val	RR	95% CI	Risk Red.	p.val
Infection								
non-user vs user	0.71	0.68–0.74	29%	<0.001	0.56	0.53–0.58	44%	<0.001
non-user vs irregular	0.81	0.76–0.86	19%	<0.001	0.68	0.64–0.73	32%	<0.001
non-user vs regular	0.60	0.53–0.68	40%	<0.001	0.51	0.45–0.58	49%	<0.001
irregular vs regular	0.75	0.66–0.84	25%	<0.001	0.75	0.66–0.85	25%	<0.001
Hospitalisation								
non-user vs user	0.77	0.58–1.04	23%	0.088	0.63	0.47–0.84	37%	0.001
non-user vs irregular	1.07	0.74–1.51	-7%	0.513	0.76	0.50–1.08	24%	0.143
non-user vs regular	0.40	0.00–0.92	60%	0.111	0.00	0.00–0.00	100%	<0.001
irregular vs regular	0.38	0.00–0.87	62%	0.075	0.00	0.00–0.00	100%	0.003
Death								
non-user vs user	0.71	0.51–1.00	29%	0.050	0.57	0.40–0.79	43%	<0.001
non-user vs irregular	1.09	0.73–1.60	-9%	0.475	0.72	0.45–1.09	28%	0.149
non-user vs regular	0.28	0.00–0.75	72%	0.060	0.27	0.00–0.71	73%	0.044
irregular vs regular	0.25	0.00–0.69	75%	0.038	0.38	0.00–1.09	62%	0.212

Table S5. i-INF model with probabilistic stop on infection. Stop probability: 0.30 (irregular), 0.05 (regular). Statistics for hospitalisations and deaths are limited to infected individuals.

Summary statistics	Simulation				KB22/KC22			
	RR	95% CI	Risk Red.	p.val	RR	95% CI	Risk Red.	p.val
Infection								
non-user vs user	0.71	0.68–0.74	29%	<0.001	0.56	0.53–0.58	44%	<0.001
non-user vs irregular	0.81	0.76–0.86	19%	<0.001	0.68	0.64–0.72	32%	<0.001
non-user vs regular	0.60	0.53–0.68	40%	<0.001	0.51	0.45–0.58	49%	<0.001
irregular vs regular	0.75	0.66–0.84	25%	<0.001	0.75	0.66–0.85	25%	<0.001
Hospitalisation								
non-user vs user	0.55	0.41–0.74	45%	<0.001	0.35	0.26–0.47	65%	<0.001
non-user vs irregular	0.86	0.60–1.23	14%	0.386	0.52	0.35–0.74	48%	<0.001
non-user vs regular	0.24	0.00–0.56	76%	0.004	0.00	0.00–0.00	100%	<0.001
irregular vs regular	0.28	0.00–0.66	72%	0.013	0.00	0.00–0.00	100%	<0.001
Death								
non-user vs user	0.51	0.36–0.71	49%	<0.001	0.32	0.22–0.44	68%	<0.001
non-user vs irregular	0.89	0.58–1.31	11%	0.437	0.49	0.31–0.74	51%	<0.001
non-user vs regular	0.17	0.00–0.46	83%	0.003	0.14	0.00–0.37	86%	<0.001
irregular vs regular	0.19	0.00–0.52	81%	0.008	0.28	0.00–0.82	72%	0.070

Table S6. i-INF model with probabilistic stop on infection. Stop probability: 0.30 (irregular), 0.05 (regular). Statistics for hospitalisations and deaths are reported for all individuals in the cohort.

Summary statistics	Simulation				KB22/KC22			
	RR	95% CI	Risk Red.	p.val	RR	95% CI	Risk Red.	p.val
Infection								
non-user vs user	0.71	0.68–0.74	29%	<0.001	0.56	0.53–0.58	44%	<0.001
non-user vs irregular	1.03	0.98–1.09	-3%	0.255	0.68	0.64–0.72	32%	<0.001
non-user vs regular	0.35	0.30–0.41	65%	<0.001	0.51	0.45–0.58	49%	<0.001
irregular vs regular	0.34	0.29–0.40	66%	<0.001	0.75	0.66–0.84	25%	<0.001
Hospitalisation								
non-user vs user	0.77	0.58–1.04	23%	0.088	0.63	0.47–0.84	37%	0.001
non-user vs irregular	0.89	0.62–1.25	11%	0.423	0.76	0.50–1.09	24%	0.143
non-user vs regular	0.68	0.00–1.58	32%	0.585	0.00	0.00–0.00	100%	<0.001
irregular vs regular	0.76	0.00–1.79	24%	0.594	0.00	0.00–0.00	100%	0.003
Death								
non-user vs user	0.71	0.51–1.00	29%	0.050	0.57	0.40–0.79	43%	<0.001
non-user vs irregular	0.92	0.62–1.33	8%	0.484	0.72	0.45–1.08	28%	0.149
non-user vs regular	0.46	0.00–1.24	54%	0.430	0.27	0.00–0.71	73%	0.044
irregular vs regular	0.50	0.00–1.38	50%	0.517	0.38	0.00–1.04	62%	0.212

Table S7. i-INF model with uniform stop on infection. Stop probability: 1.0 (all individuals). Statistics for hospitalisations and deaths are limited to infected individuals.

Summary statistics	Simulation				KB22/KC22			
	RR	95% CI	Risk Red.	p.val	RR	95% CI	Risk Red.	p.val
Infection								
non-user vs user	0.71	0.68–0.74	29%	<0.001	0.56	0.53–0.58	44%	<0.001
non-user vs irregular	1.03	0.98–1.09	-3%	0.255	0.68	0.64–0.73	32%	<0.001
non-user vs regular	0.35	0.30–0.41	65%	<0.001	0.51	0.45–0.58	49%	<0.001
irregular vs regular	0.34	0.29–0.40	66%	<0.001	0.75	0.65–0.84	25%	<0.001
Hospitalisation								
non-user vs user	0.55	0.41–0.74	45%	<0.001	0.35	0.26–0.47	65%	<0.001
non-user vs irregular	0.92	0.64–1.29	8%	0.476	0.52	0.35–0.74	48%	<0.001
non-user vs regular	0.23	0.00–0.55	77%	0.004	0.00	0.00–0.00	100%	<0.001
irregular vs regular	0.26	0.00–0.61	74%	0.009	0.00	0.00–0.00	100%	<0.001
Death								
non-user vs user	0.51	0.36–0.71	49%	<0.001	0.32	0.22–0.44	68%	<0.001
non-user vs irregular	0.94	0.63–1.38	6%	0.503	0.49	0.31–0.74	51%	<0.001
non-user vs regular	0.17	0.00–0.45	83%	0.002	0.14	0.00–0.38	86%	<0.001
irregular vs regular	0.17	0.00–0.48	83%	0.005	0.28	0.00–0.79	72%	0.070

Table S8. i-INF model with uniform stop on infection. Stop probability: 1.0 (all individuals). Statistics for hospitalisations and deaths are reported for all individuals in the cohort.

638 **i-KC22 model simulations**

Summary statistics	Simulation				KB22/KC22			
	RR	95% CI	Risk Red.	p.val	RR	95% CI	Risk Red.	p.val
Infection								
non-user vs user	0.57	0.54–0.60	43%	<0.001	0.56	0.53–0.58	44%	<0.001
non-user vs irregular	0.71	0.67–0.76	29%	<0.001	0.68	0.64–0.73	32%	<0.001
non-user vs regular	0.42	0.37–0.48	58%	<0.001	0.51	0.45–0.57	49%	<0.001
irregular vs regular	0.59	0.51–0.67	41%	<0.001	0.75	0.66–0.84	25%	<0.001
Hospitalisation								
non-user vs user	0.54	0.41–0.72	46%	<0.001	0.63	0.47–0.84	37%	0.001
non-user vs irregular	0.99	0.71–1.36	1%	0.548	0.76	0.51–1.07	24%	0.143
non-user vs regular	0.00	0.00–0.00	100%	0.001	0.00	0.00–0.00	100%	<0.001
irregular vs regular	0.00	0.00–0.00	100%	0.002	0.00	0.00–0.00	100%	0.003
Death								
non-user vs user	0.53	0.38–0.73	47%	<0.001	0.57	0.40–0.79	43%	<0.001
non-user vs irregular	1.00	0.69–1.41	0%	0.521	0.72	0.46–1.08	28%	0.149
non-user vs regular	0.00	0.00–0.00	100%	0.004	0.27	0.00–0.71	73%	0.044
irregular vs regular	0.00	0.00–0.00	100%	0.005	0.38	0.00–1.09	62%	0.212

Table S9. i-KC22 model with probabilistic stop on infection. Stop probability: 0.30 (irregular), 0.05 (regular). Statistics for hospitalisations and deaths are limited to infected individuals.

Summary statistics	Simulation				KB22/KC22			
	RR	95% CI	Risk Red.	p.val	RR	95% CI	Risk Red.	p.val
Infection								
non-user vs user	0.57	0.54–0.60	43%	<0.001	0.56	0.53–0.58	44%	<0.001
non-user vs irregular	0.71	0.67–0.76	29%	<0.001	0.68	0.64–0.73	32%	<0.001
non-user vs regular	0.42	0.37–0.48	58%	<0.001	0.51	0.45–0.58	49%	<0.001
irregular vs regular	0.59	0.51–0.67	41%	<0.001	0.75	0.66–0.84	25%	<0.001
Hospitalisation								
non-user vs user	0.31	0.23–0.42	69%	<0.001	0.35	0.26–0.46	65%	<0.001
non-user vs irregular	0.71	0.50–0.97	29%	0.038	0.52	0.35–0.73	48%	<0.001
non-user vs regular	0.00	0.00–0.00	100%	<0.001	0.00	0.00–0.00	100%	<0.001
irregular vs regular	0.00	0.00–0.00	100%	<0.001	0.00	0.00–0.00	100%	<0.001
Death								
non-user vs user	0.30	0.22–0.42	70%	<0.001	0.32	0.22–0.44	68%	<0.001
non-user vs irregular	0.71	0.48–1.01	29%	0.067	0.49	0.31–0.74	51%	<0.001
non-user vs regular	0.00	0.00–0.00	100%	<0.001	0.14	0.00–0.37	86%	<0.001
irregular vs regular	0.00	0.00–0.00	100%	<0.001	0.28	0.00–0.82	72%	0.070

Table S10. i-KC22 model with probabilistic stop on infection. Stop probability: 0.30 (irregular), 0.05 (regular). Statistics for hospitalisations and deaths are reported for all individuals in the cohort.

Summary statistics	Simulation				KB22/KC22			
	RR	95% CI	Risk Red.	p.val	RR	95% CI	Risk Red.	p.val
Infection								
non-user vs user	0.57	0.54–0.60	43%	<0.001	0.56	0.53–0.58	44%	<0.001
non-user vs irregular	1.04	0.98–1.09	-4%	0.182	0.68	0.64–0.73	32%	<0.001
non-user vs regular	0.06	0.04–0.08	94%	<0.001	0.51	0.45–0.57	49%	<0.001
irregular vs regular	0.06	0.04–0.08	94%	<0.001	0.75	0.66–0.85	25%	<0.001
Hospitalisation								
non-user vs user	0.54	0.41–0.73	46%	<0.001	0.63	0.47–0.84	37%	0.001
non-user vs irregular	0.72	0.52–0.98	28%	0.045	0.76	0.51–1.07	24%	0.143
non-user vs regular	0.00	0.00–0.00	100%	0.631	0.00	0.00–0.00	100%	<0.001
irregular vs regular	0.00	0.00–0.00	100%	1.000	0.00	0.00–0.00	100%	0.003
Death								
non-user vs user	0.53	0.38–0.73	47%	<0.001	0.57	0.40–0.78	43%	<0.001
non-user vs irregular	0.73	0.51–1.02	27%	0.079	0.72	0.45–1.08	28%	0.149
non-user vs regular	0.00	0.00–0.00	100%	1.000	0.27	0.00–0.71	73%	0.044
irregular vs regular	0.00	0.00–0.00	100%	1.000	0.38	0.00–1.09	62%	0.212

Table S11. i-KC22 model with uniform stop on infection. Stop probability: 1.0 (all individuals). Statistics for hospitalisations and deaths are limited to infected individuals.

639 **i-KC22 model simulations**

Summary statistics	Simulation				KB22/KC22			
	RR	95% CI	Risk Red.	p.val	RR	95% CI	Risk Red.	p.val
Infection								
non-user vs user	0.57	0.54–0.60	43%	<0.001	0.56	0.53–0.58	44%	<0.001
non-user vs irregular	1.04	0.98–1.09	-4%	0.182	0.68	0.64–0.73	32%	<0.001
non-user vs regular	0.06	0.04–0.08	94%	<0.001	0.51	0.45–0.57	49%	<0.001
irregular vs regular	0.06	0.04–0.08	94%	<0.001	0.75	0.66–0.84	25%	<0.001
Hospitalisation								
non-user vs user	0.31	0.23–0.42	69%	<0.001	0.35	0.26–0.47	65%	<0.001
non-user vs irregular	0.75	0.54–1.02	25%	0.076	0.52	0.35–0.74	48%	<0.001
non-user vs regular	0.00	0.00–0.00	100%	<0.001	0.00	0.00–0.00	100%	<0.001
irregular vs regular	0.00	0.00–0.00	100%	<0.001	0.00	0.00–0.00	100%	<0.001
Death								
non-user vs user	0.30	0.22–0.42	70%	<0.001	0.32	0.22–0.44	68%	<0.001
non-user vs irregular	0.75	0.52–1.06	25%	0.123	0.49	0.30–0.74	51%	<0.001
non-user vs regular	0.00	0.00–0.00	100%	<0.001	0.14	0.00–0.38	86%	<0.001
irregular vs regular	0.00	0.00–0.00	100%	<0.001	0.28	0.00–0.82	72%	0.070

Table S12. i-KC22 model with uniform stop on infection. Stop probability: 1.0 (all individuals). Statistics for hospitalisations and deaths are reported for all individuals in the cohort.