

1           **Community vaccination can shorten the COVID-19 isolation**  
2                           **period: an individual-based modeling approach**

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**NOTE: This preprint reports new research that has not been certified by peer review and should not be used to guide clinical practice.**

## 24 **Abstract**

25 **Background:** Isolation of infected individuals and quarantine of their contacts are usually  
26 employed to mitigate the transmission of SARS-CoV-2. While 14-day isolation of infected  
27 individuals could effectively reduce the risk of subsequent transmission, it also significantly  
28 impacts the patient's financial, psychological, and emotional well-being. It is, therefore, vital  
29 to investigate how the isolation duration could be shortened when effective vaccines are  
30 available and in what circumstances we can live with COVID-19 without isolation and  
31 quarantine.

32 **Methods:** An individual-based modeling approach was employed to estimate the likelihood of  
33 secondary infections and the likelihood of an outbreak following the isolation of an index case  
34 for a range of isolation periods. Our individual-based model integrates the viral load and  
35 infectiousness profiles of vaccinated and unvaccinated infected individuals. The effects of  
36 waning vaccine-induced immunity against Delta and Omicron variant transmission were also  
37 investigated.

38 **Results:** In the baseline scenario in which all individuals are unvaccinated, and no  
39 nonpharmaceutical interventions are employed, there is a chance of about 3% that an  
40 unvaccinated index case will make at least one secondary infection after being isolated for 14  
41 days, and a sustained chain of transmission can occur with a chance of less than 1%. We found  
42 that at the outbreak risk equivalent to that of 14-day isolation in the baseline scenario, the  
43 isolation duration can be shortened to 7.33 days (95% CI 6.68-7.98) if 75% of people in the  
44 community are fully vaccinated during the last three months. In the best-case scenario in which  
45 all individuals in the community are fully vaccinated, isolation of infected individuals may no  
46 longer be necessary, at least during the first three months after being fully vaccinated,  
47 indicating that booster vaccination may be required after being fully vaccinated for three to  
48 four months. Finally, our simulations showed that the reduced vaccine effectiveness against  
49 Omicron variant transmission does not much affect the risk of an outbreak if the vaccine  
50 effectiveness against infection is maintained at a high level via booster vaccination.

51 **Conclusions:** The isolation duration of a vaccine breakthrough infector could be safely  
52 shortened if a majority of people in the community are immune to SARS-CoV-2 infection. A  
53 booster vaccination may be necessary three months after full vaccination to keep the outbreak  
54 risk low.

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## 56 **Background**

57 SARS-CoV-2 spreads rapidly throughout the world, causing over 288.23 million  
58 infections and 5.48 million deaths by the end of 2021 [1]. During the early phase of  
59 transmission, when vaccines were unavailable, nonpharmaceutical interventions have been  
60 frontline measures to mitigate the transmission [2, 3]. Isolation, i.e., separation and limitation  
61 of mobility of infected people, is a critical strategy widely employed to break the transmission  
62 chain. Institution-based isolation of confirmed cases has been shown in a modeling study to  
63 delay the epidemic's peak and reduce the epidemic's size by approximately 57% [4]. Isolation,  
64 however, will be effective only if it can be promptly employed to prevent presymptomatic and  
65 asymptomatic transmission [5]. In addition, the isolation period should also be long enough to  
66 ensure that the infected individuals do not spread the disease after the isolation. However, while  
67 prolonged confinement may reduce the risk of transmission more effectively, it may have a  
68 significant impact on the patient's financial, psychological, and emotional well-being [6-8].

69 COVID-19 vaccines were first made available in the last month of 2020 [9], and they  
70 have been shown to be effective at preventing infection and transmission [10-12]. Despite the  
71 fact that infections can occur even after being fully vaccinated, a faster viral clearance was seen  
72 in the breakthrough infections, resulting in a shorter duration of infectiousness [13, 14]. As a  
73 result, it suggests that those who have been vaccinated may require a shorter period for  
74 isolation. It is vital to comprehend how the isolation duration could be reduced based on  
75 vaccine effectiveness, particularly when we want to return to normalcy and live with COVID-  
76 19 without quarantine and isolation measures.

77 In this study, we used an individual-based modeling approach to assess the likelihood  
78 of secondary infections and the likelihood of an outbreak following isolation of a vaccinated  
79 index case for a range of isolation periods. Our individual-based model accounts for  
80 transmission heterogeneity, variation in the course of infection, and the disease's infectivity  
81 profile. The effects of waning vaccine-induced immunity and the delay in isolating infected  
82 individuals in the community were also examined.

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## 85 **Methods**

### 86 **Estimation of infectiousness profiles and vaccine efficiency against** 87 **transmission**


88 People infected with SARS-CoV-2 can become infectious prior to the onset of  
89 symptoms. In the case of unvaccinated individuals, the infectiousness peaks 2.1 days before  
90 the start of symptoms and then decreases gradually during the course of the illness [15]. Viral  
91 trajectories in proliferation duration are similar in the unvaccinated and vaccinated individuals,  
92 but the viral load is cleared faster in vaccine breakthrough infection than in the unvaccinated  
93 group [13, 14]. The disease infectiousness ( $F$ ) prior to the peak of both vaccinated and  
94 unvaccinated infectors was therefore assumed to follow a gamma distribution, as described in  
95 [15]. After the peak period, data on  $C_t$  values collected in Singapore [13] were used to  
96 determine the infectiousness profile. The infectiousness was considered to be directly  
97 proportional to the viral load ( $V$ ) that exceeds a threshold of  $10^6$  copies, i.e.,  $F \propto Vx10^{-6}$  [16].  $C_t$   
98 values were converted to viral load ( $V$ ) using the procedures outlined in [14]. Because of the  
99 faster viral clearance time, the disease transmissibility of vaccinated infectors could be averted  
100 compared to unvaccinated ones. In this work, we estimated the vaccine efficacy against  
101 transmission from a percentage of reduction in the area under the curves of the disease  
102 infectiousness profiles.

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### 104 **Model structure**

105 In order to examine the probability of post-isolation infections, the transmissions of the  
106 COVID-19 were simulated with individuals categorized as susceptible ( $S$ ), latent ( $L$ ), infectious  
107 ( $I$ ), recovered ( $R$ ), isolated ( $Q$ ), and fully vaccinated ( $V$ ) according to their infection and  
108 vaccination status. Infectious individuals are further divided into symptomatic ( $I_S$ ) and  
109 asymptomatic ( $I_A$ ) groups, with the assumption that asymptomatic individuals are less  
110 infectious than symptomatic ones. Although COVID-19 vaccines cannot entirely protect  
111 people against the infection, they are still beneficial in decreasing the chance of infection and  
112 the chance of becoming symptomatic. In addition, even vaccinated individuals do get infected,  
113 they will be less likely to transmit the disease to other individuals. In our model, vaccine  
114 breakthrough infections are distinguished from infections in susceptible individuals by

115 subscripts  $V$  and  $S$ , as shown in **Figure 1(A)**. After being infected, individuals enter a latent  
 116 state before becoming infectious. Finally, infectious individuals move either to recovered or  
 117 isolated compartments.



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119 **Figure 1: Model structure of the COVID-19 transmission.** (A) Schematic of the  
 120 compartmental model showing progressive of the disease and transition of individuals across  
 121 different compartments. (B) Example of the expected number of secondary cases made by a  
 122 single primary case drawn from a negative binomial distribution. (C) An illustration of  
 123 transmission events due to the primary case (red circle). The generation time is a time duration  
 124 between a primary case's infection and one of its subsequent secondary cases. The incubation

125 period is a time duration from exposure to symptom onset. The inset shows the infectiousness  
126 profiles of unvaccinated (UV) and vaccinated (V) individuals.

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128 The number of secondary infections caused by a single primary case,  $Z$ , for each  
129 infected individual is estimated from a negative binomial distribution with a mean equal to the  
130 reproduction number ( $R_0$ ) and dispersion parameter ( $k$ ) (**Figure 1(B)**). Because of the lower  
131 infectivity of asymptomatic infectors, they contribute fewer infections; the mean number of  
132 secondary cases made by an asymptomatic individual was reduced by a factor  $r$ . For the vaccine  
133 breakthrough infectors, the mean of the distribution is also reduced due to the efficiency against  
134 transmission ( $e_I$ ) of vaccines.

135 An example of the transmission events is illustrated in **Figure 1(C)**. The incubation  
136 period, time from exposure to symptom onset, is assumed to follow the Gamma distribution  
137 with a mean of 5.8 days [15]. The time of each new infection is drawn from a random number  
138 distribution that is distributed according to the infectiousness profile of the infectors.  
139 Transmission can take place before symptoms start. As a result of the vaccine's effectiveness  
140 against infection, vaccinated persons are less likely to become infected. The effective infectious  
141 period was determined by whether or not they were isolated. If infectors are isolated, they will  
142 be contagious until they are isolated. Although transmission can be prevented during the  
143 isolation period, post-isolation infections are still possible. The generation time between  
144 infection of a primary case and one of its subsequent secondary cases is dependent on both the  
145 incubation period and the infection time. In our study, the primary index case is assumed to be  
146 isolated immediately after becoming infected, whereas other subsequent infected individuals  
147 in the community are isolated with a delay of 6.8 days.

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154 **Table 1: Model parameters and their default values**

Parameter	Default value	Source
Basic reproduction number ( $R_0$ )	5.08	[17]
Overdispersion parameter ( $k$ )	0.08	[18]
Incubation period distribution (Gamma distribution)		
- Mean	5.8 days	
- Shape parameter	3.64	[15]
- Scale parameter	1.59	
Probability of being symptomatic		
- Unvaccinated individuals	0.573	[19]
- Vaccinated individuals	0.431	[19]
Reduction in infectiousness of asymptomatic individual ( $r$ )	0.58	[20]
Vaccine efficiency against infection ( $e_s$ )	0.79	[12]
Vaccine efficiency against transmission ( $e_t$ )	0.25	Estimation
Probability that symptomatic individuals will be isolated	0.8	Assumption
Probability that asymptomatic individuals will be isolated	0.1	Assumption
Time delay from infection to isolation		
- Index case	0 days	Assumption
- Infected individuals in community	6.8 days	Assumption

## 156 Results


### 157 Impact of vaccination on post-isolation transmission

158 We explored the probability of a primary infected individual making at least one  
159 secondary infection and the probability of a successful outbreak, i.e., having a sustained chain  
160 of transmission, after being released from isolation. In the baseline scenario in which the  
161 primary case and all other individuals in the community are unvaccinated, we found that there  
162 is a chance of about 3% that the unvaccinated index case will make at least one secondary  
163 infection after being isolated for 14 days, and a sustained chain of transmission can occur with  
164 a chance of less than 1% (left bars in

165 **Figure 2(A)-(B)**). However, if the index case has already been vaccinated, we found  
166 that although all other individuals in the community are unvaccinated, only about 10 days of  
167 isolation is equivalent to 14-day isolation of unvaccinated index case (red lines and red symbols  
168 in **Figure 2**).

169 Vaccinating people in the community can further reduce the likelihood of secondary  
170 infection and the probability of a successful outbreak. It was found that higher community  
171 vaccine coverages decrease the chance of secondary infection following the isolation of the  
172 vaccinated index case more, especially when the isolation periods are short. In addition, when  
173 the isolation period is longer than 12 days, there is no apparent difference between different  
174 vaccination coverages. At the outbreak risk equivalent to that of 14-day isolation in the baseline  
175 scenario, the isolation duration of the primary vaccinated infector can be shortened to 9.33 days  
176 (95% CI 8.68-9.98) if 50% of people in the community are vaccinated. When 75% of people  
177 in the community are vaccinated, the isolation period can be further shortened to 7.33 days  
178 (95% CI 6.68-7.98). Finally, we found that in the extreme limit in which all individuals are  
179 vaccinated, although post-isolation infections are still possible for the isolation period of  
180 shorter than 6 days, the chance of sustained chain of transmission to occur is extremely rare.  
181 In this case, isolation may no longer be necessary (**Figure 2 (D)**).





182 **Figure 2: Impacts of isolating a primary vaccinated infector on post-isolation**  
 183 **transmission.** Probability of secondary transmission (A) and probability of successful  
 184 outbreak in which a chain of transmission can be sustained (C) after a range of isolation periods  
 185 and vaccination levels in the community. The corresponding probabilities in the baseline  
 186 scenario where the index case and all other individuals in the community are unvaccinated are  
 187 shown as bar graphs on the left side of both subfigures. (B) and (D) show the isolation period  
 188 equivalent to the 14-day isolation period in the baseline scenarios regarding the probability of  
 189 secondary transmission and the probability of a successful outbreak, respectively. Error bars  
 190 indicate 95% CI.

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## 193 **Effect of waning vaccine-induced immunity**


194 As the vaccine effectiveness decreases over time [21], we evaluated its effect on the  
195 probability of secondary infection and the probability of a successful outbreak following  
196 isolation. We found that for a low level of immunization (< 25% coverage), both the post-  
197 isolation transmission probability and the successful outbreak probability are not significantly  
198 affected by the waning of vaccine effectiveness ( **even** there is no isolation.

199 We also investigated how the change in vaccine effectiveness against transmission  
200 would influence the likelihood of secondary infection and the probability of a successful  
201 outbreak. In this part, we considered the vaccine effectiveness against transmission ( $e_I$ ) ranges  
202 from 0% to 40%, and the vaccine effectiveness against infection ( $e_S$ ) of 0.9 and 0.5,  
203 corresponding to the effectiveness against infection after being fully vaccinated for one month  
204 and four months, respectively. We found that during the first four months after complete  
205 vaccination, when the vaccine effectiveness against infection is high, the vaccine effectiveness  
206 against transmission had only a minor effect on the transmission, especially when the isolation  
207 period is long (**Figure 4**).

208 **Figure 3 A and D**). However, for higher vaccine coverage, the effect of the decline in  
209 the vaccine effectiveness is more pronounced, especially when the isolation durations are short.  
210 Note, however, that although at high vaccination coverage (> 75% coverage), there is a more  
211 significant effect of immunity waning across a range of isolation periods, the probability of an  
212 outbreak is still lower than that in the case when 25% of the population are vaccinated. With  
213 the vaccine coverage of 75%, for example, after 4 months of vaccination, the outbreak risk  
214 climbs from 0.9% to 4.2% for 3-day isolation and increases from 1.3% to 7.7% for no isolation.  
215 When all individuals in the community are vaccinated, despite a substantial decrease in vaccine  
216 effectiveness after four months, the chance of a successful outbreak is still lower than 4% even  
217 there is no isolation.


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221 from 0% to 40%, and the vaccine effectiveness against infection ( $e_S$ ) of 0.9 and 0.5,  
222 corresponding to the effectiveness against infection after being fully vaccinated for one month  
223 and four months, respectively. We found that during the first four months after complete

224 vaccination, when the vaccine effectiveness against infection is high, the vaccine effectiveness  
 225 against transmission had only a minor effect on the transmission, especially when the isolation  
 226 period is long (Figure 4).



227 **Figure 3: The effect of reduction in vaccine effectiveness against SARS-CoV-2 infection.**  
 228 The time evolution of the probability of at least one secondary infection (A-C) and probability  
 229 of successful outbreak (D-F) following the release of a breakthrough infector from isolation as  
 230 the vaccine effectiveness against infection wanes (black lines, right y-axis) [21].

231



232 **Figure 4: The influence of vaccine effectiveness against SARS-CoV-2 transmission.** The  
233 probability of at least one secondary infection (A and B) and a successful outbreak (C and D)  
234 after being released from isolation into a community with a vaccination level of 75%. The  
235 vaccine effectiveness against transmission ( $e_i$ ) was varied from 0% to 40%, and the vaccine  
236 effectiveness against infection ( $e_s$ ) was fixed at 0.9 (left column) and 0.5 (right column).

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
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## 240 Impact of community case-isolation and other control measures

241 We next evaluated the impact of time delay from infection to the isolation of infected  
242 individuals in the community on the spread of SARS-CoV-2. Our results indicated that the  
243 outbreak would be less likely to occur if case isolation is performed with a shorter delay (

244 **Figure 5**). For example, under the vaccine coverage of 75%, the outbreak risk could be  
245 suppressed to low than 1% if the isolation can be performed within 3 days after infections. To  
246 maintain the same level of an outbreak risk, a longer duration of the isolation is needed for the  
247 isolation with longer delays. For instance, for a 5-day delay, at least 5 days of isolation may be  
248 required, and for a 7-day delay, at least 7 days of isolation may be needed. When only 25% of  
249 individuals are vaccinated, isolation may be required for at least 10 days, regardless of how  
250 quickly infected individuals are isolated.

251



252 **Figure 5: Impact of time delay from infection to isolation under vaccination coverages**  
253 **of (A) 25% and (B) 75%.**

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
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260 The effective reproduction number ( $R$ ) is commonly used to measure the disease  
261 transmissivity under different control measures. To consider the effects of other control  
262 measures, a sensitivity analysis on the effective reproduction number has been performed. In  
263 combination with other non-pharmaceutical interventions, we found that community  
264 vaccination could further shorten the isolation period (**Figure 6**). For instance, in the absence  
265 of any non-pharmaceutical interventions and the vaccine coverage is only 25%, case isolation  
266 may be required for at least 12 days to reduce the outbreak risk to 1%. However, if other control  
267 measures are concurrently implemented at a level that could reduce the effective reproduction  
268 number to 3.2, only one week of isolation is sufficient. Importantly, in this case, isolation will  
269 be no longer necessary if the community vaccination level reaches 75%.  
270



271 **Figure 6: A sensitivity analysis on the effective reproduction number.** The probability of  
272 successful outbreak under the community vaccination coverages of (A) 25% and (B) 75% with  
273 the time delay to the isolation of 6.8 days.

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## 279 Discussion

280 In this work, we evaluated the likelihood of at least one secondary infection and the  
281 likelihood of an outbreak following the isolation of a vaccine breakthrough infector for a  
282 specified period of time. Our modeling results indicated that vaccines play a critical role in  
283 reducing the likelihood of post-isolation transmission. We discovered that the duration of  
284 isolation for an infected individual who has already been vaccinated could be reduced as  
285 opposed to the 14-day duration of isolation for unvaccinated individuals. Additionally, the  
286 duration of isolation can be reduced further if the majority of the community members are  
287 immune to the disease.

288 In the best case in which all individuals in the community are fully vaccinated, isolation  
289 of infected vaccinated individuals may no longer be required, at least during the first three  
290 months after being fully vaccinated, if no other non-pharmaceutical interventions are  
291 implemented. After four months, however, as the vaccine effectiveness against infection drops  
292 to around 53% [21], the probability of post-isolation transmission increases rapidly after this  
293 time, especially in the cases of short isolation periods. This result indicates that booster  
294 vaccination may be needed after being fully vaccinated for three to four months; otherwise,  
295 more extended isolation periods or other non-pharmaceutical control measures may be  
296 necessary to compensate for the increased transmission risk.

297 With a faster viral clearance time in vaccinated individuals, vaccines have been  
298 hypothesized to reduce onward transmission from infected vaccinated individuals. According  
299 to our estimations, the vaccine effectiveness against transmission of 24.6% is comparable to  
300 the effectiveness against transmission with the Delta variant after getting two doses of the  
301 Pfizer vaccine [22]. However, the emergence of the Omicron variant has raised serious  
302 concerns about its capability to evade vaccine protection. After receiving two doses of mRNA  
303 vaccines, the vaccine effectiveness in preventing Omicron-variant transmission drops to less  
304 than 5% [22]. Nevertheless, our simulations showed that the reduced vaccine effectiveness  
305 against Omicron-variant transmission does not much affect the risk of secondary infection if  
306 the vaccine effectiveness against infection is maintained at a high level, possibly via booster  
307 vaccination [23].

308 When considering the effect of delay in isolation of infected individuals in the  
309 community, we found that a shorter delay to isolation can further shorten the isolation period,  
310 especially in the high vaccine coverage settings. In addition, we found that while an outbreak

311 may still occur in the absence of isolation in the community with low vaccination coverage,  
312 the risk could be minimized when additional control measures such as contact tracing and  
313 quarantine of their contacts, as well as testing, are implemented (**Figure 6**).

314

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