

# A single holiday was the turning point of the COVID-19 policy of Israel

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## 42 **Abstract**

### 43 **Background:**

44           The impact of COVID-19 has been profound, and the public health challenge  
45 seem to be the most serious regarding respiratory viruses since the 1918 H1N1  
46 influenza pandemic. In the absence of effective vaccine or biomedical treatment, the  
47 basic rules of public health measures have not changed, namely public distancing.

### 48 **Methods:**

49           We analyzed epidemiological investigation reports during the first month of  
50 the outbreak in Israel. In addition, we present a deterministic compartment model and  
51 simulations of several scenarios emphasizing quarantine and isolation policies given  
52 their efficiency.

### 53 **Results:**

54           We identify an abrupt change from controlled epidemic regime to an  
55 exponential growth ( $R_0 = 2.19$ ) in light of the actual policy-makers decisions and  
56 public behavior in Israel. Our analysis show that before the abrupt change, the new  
57 cases trend was due to returning citizens infected abroad. The abrupt change followed  
58 a holiday in which social distancing was clearly inefficient and many public  
59 gatherings were held. We further discuss three different modeled scenarios of  
60 quarantine efficiency: high-, medium-, and low-efficiency.

### 61 **Conclusions:**

62           Israel early lessons show that there is no allowance to compromise with the  
63 directive of social distancing. Even before the onset of the pandemic in Israel, fine-  
64 tuned but determined early decisions were taken by policy makers to monitor flight  
65 arrivals from Covid-19 affected regions and to limit public gatherings. Our analysis  
66 show that one particular holiday has shifted the occurrence curve from controlled

67 regime to exponential growth. Therefore, even a short lapse in public responsiveness  
68 can have a dramatic effect.

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## 72 **1. Introduction**

73           Since its emergence the impact of COVID-19 has been profound, and the  
74 public health challenge seem to be the most serious seen in a respiratory virus since  
75 the 1918 H1N1 influenza pandemic (Soper 1919). In this study we present the results  
76 of epidemiological data and modelling of one month since the onset of the outbreak in  
77 Isreal, addressing public events occurring during this period and the sensitivity to a  
78 number of public health measures focusing on social distancing (quarantine and  
79 isolation).

80           The epidemiological data studied, consisting of 381 laboratory confirmed  
81 COVID-19 cases, has been obtained from the epidemiological investigation reports  
82 that were released by the Israeli Ministry of Health (Israeli Ministry of Health, 2020).  
83 This allowed us to identify and separate the incoming from abroad (which policy  
84 required to enter quarantine on arrival) to the local cases, thus analyzing the net  
85 contribution of local infections.

86           In addition, we present an extended deterministic SEIR (Susceptible, Exposed,  
87 Infectious, and Recovered) model to simulate disease outbreak scenarios. In  
88 particular, the model includes quarantine of asymptomatic suspected population  
89 (exposed) and isolation of symptomatic and infectious patients. The model takes into  
90 account the efficiency of the quarantine and isolation measures. We discuss three  
91 different quarantine efficiency scenarios: high-efficiency, medium-efficiency, and

92 low-efficiency. The resulting analysis from the epidemiological cases data are  
93 discussed in light of public events and compared to model simulations. We analyze  
94 and discuss an abrupt change from controlled epidemic regime to an exponential  
95 growth regime in light of policy makers' decisions and public behavior.

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## 97 **2. Methods**

98         The dynamics of spread of epidemics as well as the quarantine-isolation policy  
99 of Israel was modeled using the SEQIJR model (e.g. Gumel, et al., 2004). This is a  
100 deterministic compartmental model which allows the implicit inclusion of biological  
101 epidemiological phases (including incubation period) as well as governmental  
102 interventions such as quarantine and their actual efficiency of implementation. A  
103 successful a posteriori implementation of this model to the transmission dynamics and  
104 control of the SARS epidemics in Toronto, Hong Kong, Singapore and Beijing is  
105 given in Gumel, et al., 2004. The model consists of a system of 7 dynamical equations  
106 and 15 parameters. For details of the model and its parameters see the online  
107 supplementary information.

108         The data analyzed in this study was obtained from the epidemiological  
109 investigation reports that were released by the Israeli Ministry of Health (Israeli  
110 Ministry of Health, 2020). From the total of 883 PCR laboratory confirmed COVID-  
111 19 cases we analyzed the 384 cases that were investigated epidemiologically,  
112 allowing us to separate the incoming from abroad (quarantined on arrival by policy)  
113 to local cases. This allowed us to separate the imported cases (travelers arriving from  
114 abroad) from the locally infected cases. The data spans over the first month of the  
115 COVID-19 outbreak in Israel, beginning in February 21<sup>st</sup> 2020 and going until March  
116 20<sup>th</sup>. We further note that during the examined period the number of PCR tests

117 performed rose daily, reaching 1869 at the end of the period. However, the proportion  
118 of positive tests remained approximately the same, as 7.9% (Israeli Ministry of  
119 Health, 2020).

120 The incidence curve was modelled as a fit to an exponential growth function  
121 (de Silva, et al., 2009; Zhao, et al., 2020). Several serial interval distributions that  
122 were estimated for COVID-19 were examined (Nishiura, et al., 2020; Ganyani, et al.,  
123 2020; Zhao, et al., 2020).


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### 125 **3. Results**

126 The dynamics of epidemic spread in Israel in terms of daily reported  
127 confirmed cases is shown in fig. 1. There are two distinct regimes in the curve. The  
128 first ended in March 12, 2020 in which the local to travel associated infection ratio  
129 was around 1:3 (up to 1:2.5), i.e., for every three imported cases, there was one local  
130 infection. The second period, began a day later. The first distinct sign for the change  
131 was evident on March 14<sup>th</sup> where the ratio rose to 1:2, then continued to rise on March  
132 17<sup>th</sup> to 1:1.5 and finally, after a month into the epidemic in Israel, on March 21<sup>st</sup> there  
133 were more local infections in Israel than imported cases (the ratio was above 1:1).

134 March 12<sup>th</sup> is two days after the Jewish holiday of Purim, which this year was  
135 celebrated on March 10<sup>th</sup>. Purim customs include wearing masks and costumes and  
136 holding public celebrations, parades as well as religious gatherings. Because Purim is  
137 also a school holiday, many celebration are held a day or two earlier.

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140 FIG. 1. Accumulated reported confirmed COVID-19 cases in Israel (blue bars)

141 and the ratio of local infections to travel associated infections (orange line)

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143 The effective reproduction number,  $R_0$ , was estimated for the daily new cases

144 data of the first month of the COVID-19 epidemic. The lowest estimated  $R_0$  was 2.08

145 (95%CI 1.93-2.6) for the Gamma distributed serial interval with mean 4.4 and SD 3

146 days (Zhao, et al., 2020). The highest estimate was 2.37 (95%CI 2.16-2.61) for the

147 Gamma distributed serial interval with mean 5.2 and SD 2.8 days (Ganyani, et al.,

148 2020). The mean  $R_0$  overall the serial interval distributions examined, was 2.19.

149 The SEQJR model solutions are characterized by 3 locally stable equilibrium

150 points in parameters space. These refer to the following regimes or types of dynamics

151 of epidemic spread: controlled (decaying), flattened, uncontrolled (baseline SEIR


152 model; further details can be found in the supplementary material). In this study we

153 simulated three scenarios, the first corresponding to the first equilibrium and two

154 corresponding to the second:

- 155                   1. A controlled high-efficiency quarantining (decaying green curve in  
156                   Fig. 2). This regime is characterized by an early entry of asymptomatic  
157                   suspected population to home quarantine. Moreover we assume the  
158                   infectiousness in home quarantine is one sixth compared to free  
159                   asymptomatic. The efficiency of isolation is 70%.
- 160                   2. A flattened for medium-efficiency quarantining (purple curve in Fig.  
161                   2). This regime is characterized by a late entry of asymptomatic  
162                   suspected population to home quarantine. Moreover we assume the  
163                   infectiousness in home quarantine is one third compared to free  
164                   asymptomatic. The efficiency of isolation is 70%.
- 165                   3. A flattened for low-efficiency quarantining (light-blue curve in Fig. 2).  
166                   This regime is characterized by a late entry of asymptomatic suspected  
167                   population to home quarantine. Moreover we assume the  
168                   infectiousness in home quarantine is similar to free asymptomatic. The  
169                   efficiency of isolation is 30%.

170   As discussed above, the dynamics of epidemic spread in Israel until March 8, 2020  
171   corresponds to the controlled regime characterizes with  $R_0$  of the order of half (green  
172   curve in Fig. 2). On the other hand, after March 8, 2020 the regime corresponds to the  
173   flattened regime with low-efficiency quarantining and  $R_0 = 2.19$ .



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FIG. 2. Total number of symptomatic cases in Israel from SEQIJR model

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simulations for 3 scenarios: green – high-efficiency quarantining, purple – medium-

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efficiency quarantining, light blue – low-efficiency quarantining.

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## 179 4. Discussion

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Israel has begun early its mitigation policy against the COVID-19 epidemic.

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From the beginning of February, it was decided: to close all border passages (via land,

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sea and air) to people that are not Israeli citizens or resident that have visited China

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recently; to stop all direct flights from Israel to China and to require Israeli citizens

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returning from China or that were in touch with a confirmed COVID-19 patients to a

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14 days home quarantine. A short while later, the quarantine requirement was

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expanded to other Asian countries. The first COVID-19 patients in Israel were two

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passengers that returned from the “Diamond Princess”, in 21 and 23 of February.



188 They entered directly to hospital isolation. A week later, a passenger from Italy was  
189 diagnosed as a COVID-19 patient, and Italy was added to the list of countries that  
190 require 14 days quarantine.

191 The quarantine-isolation policy succeeded in keeping the rate of daily new  
192 cases small, up until March 9<sup>th</sup>. Then, 4 days later, a sudden change of regime has  
193 occurred, which was manifested by the distinct change of the epidemic curve of Israel  
194 towards exponential growth. March 15<sup>th</sup> marks the first time that the daily new cases  
195 of locally infected were higher than the new travel associated cases.

196 The timing of this abrupt change is not of coincidence. Regarding the cases  
197 arriving from abroad, a requirement for home quarantine affecting all travelers  
198 arriving began on March 9<sup>th</sup>. Moreover, during the period between March 9<sup>th</sup> to 11<sup>th</sup> a  
199 Jewish holiday, Purim, was celebrated. This holiday is characterized by big parades  
200 organized by local municipalities, as well as religious gatherings and privately  
201 organized parties. Although authorities cancelled the public parades, many privately  
202 organized and religious crowding had occurred. Regrettably, these drove Israel from a  
203 controlled, mitigated regime to an exponential growth, as described in the results  
204 section. Therefore, despite its intense efforts, Israel's effective  $R_0$  for the period  
205 ending in March 20<sup>th</sup> stands on around 2.19, slightly smaller than the  $R_0$  of 2.6-3.2  
206 estimated for the republic of Korea and Italy, for the period ending in March 5<sup>th</sup>.  
207 Such abrupt transition based on social behavior emphasizes the fragility of mitigation  
208 policies.

209 We therefore emphasize the importance of early fine-tuned but intense  
210 directives for social distancing and isolation measures. This study clearly  
211 demonstrates the lesson learned from the Israeli policy, that even a short lapse in

212 public responsiveness can have a dramatic effect on public health during pandemic  
213 outbreak.

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