

1 **A data-driven tool for tracking and predicting the course of COVID-19**
2 **epidemic as it evolves**

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4

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14

15 **KEYWORDS**

16 Covid-19; Epidemiology; Data-driven approach; prediction of turning point; Existing
17 Infected Cases; peak EIC number; duration of hospital stay; end of epidemic; local-
18 in-time metric.

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20

21 **ABSTRACT**

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23 **For an emergent disease, such as Covid-19, with no past epidemiological data**
24 **to guide models, modelers struggle to make predictions of the course of the**
25 **epidemic (1), and when predictions were made the results would vary widely.**
26 **Yet much empirical information is already contained in the data of evolving**
27 **epidemiological profiles. We show, for epidemics of low fatality rate, both**
28 **empirically with data, and theoretically, how the ratio of daily infected and**
29 **recovered cases can be used to track and predict the course of the epidemic.**
30 **Ability to predict the turning points and the epidemic's end is of crucial**
31 **importance for fighting the epidemic and planning for a return to normalcy.**
32 **The accuracy of the prediction of the peaks of the epidemic is validated using**
33 **data in different regions in China showing the effects of different levels of**
34 **quarantine. The validated tool can be applied to other countries where Covid-**
35 **19 has spread, and generally to future epidemics. A preliminary prediction for**
36 **South Korea is made with limited data, with end of the epidemic as early as the**
37 **second week of April, surprisingly.**

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39 **SIGNIFICANCE:** We offer a practical tool, as an alternative to traditional models, for
40 tracking and predicting the course of an epidemic using the daily data on the
41 infection and recovery. This data-driven tool can predict the turning points two
42 weeks in advance, with an accuracy of 2-3 days, validated using data from various
43 regions in China selected to show the effects of quarantine. It also gives information
44 on how rapid the rise and fall of the case numbers are. Although empirical, this
45 approach has a sound theoretical foundation; the main components of the results
46 are validated after the epidemic is near an end, as is the case for China, and
47 therefore generally applicable to future epidemics of low fatality rate.

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50 **Main text:**

51

52 **Introduction.**

53 The current COVID-19 epidemic is caused by a novel corona virus, designated
54 officially as SARS-CoV-2, spreading from Wuhan, the capital city of Hubei province in
55 China (2-4). The new virus seems to have characteristics different from SARS
56 (severe acute respiratory syndrome) (5, 6): it is less deadly but more virulent (7-10).
57 Modeling the epidemic as it develops has been difficult (1). Depending on the model
58 assumptions, predictions of when it “turns a corner” varies wildly (11-21), from now
59 or until after 650 million people have been infected before peaking in the “worst-
60 case scenario” (22). Now as the epidemic has spread beyond China (23, 24), a
61 reliable prediction of the course of the outbreak in each region is critical for the
62 management and containment of the epidemic, and reducing public anxiety and
63 panic. China has instituted some of the strictest quarantine measures around Wuhan
64 and Hubei, which may or may not be adoptable in other countries (25-27). It would
65 be useful to extract the dependence of the epidemic’s evolution on the degree of
66 quarantine to guide policy decisions, while also to characterize properties of Covid-
67 19 that are applicable to other countries.

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
69 The turning point and the end of the epidemic are the two most watched markers on
70 its development (28, 29). There are various definitions of the turning point. A
71 common one defines the turning point of the epidemic as the reported daily number
72 of newly infected reaching a peak and then declining. This is the one touted in the
73 various news announcements, and also used by some research groups (22). The fact
74 that the number of newly infected reaching a peak and then declining does not
75 necessarily imply that the epidemic has “turned a corner”, because the total number
76 of still-infected can still be rising with the associated urgent need for additional
77 medical resources, such as hospital beds and isolation wards. Furthermore, locating
78 this peak is highly susceptible to data glitches and change in diagnostic definition.
79 For example, on 12 February, when Hubei changed its definition of confirmed
80 infection from the gold standard of nucleic acid gene-sequencing tests to clinical
81 observations and radiological chest scans, over 14,000 newly infected cases were
82 added that day, creating a peak that has not been exceeded since. Overwhelmed
83 doctors in Wuhan pleaded for the change so that they did not have to wait for the
84 returned tests to confirm the infection. If the definition of the turning point based on
85 the peak of newly infected were used, it would have given 12 February as the
86 turning point for Hubei. Outside Hubei, there was no change in definition for the
87 “infected”.

88

89 A more meaningful turning point should be based on the number of confirmed
90 infected individuals, designated as the Existing Infected Cases (*EIC*)(15), reaching a
91 peak and then starting to decline. *EIC* is in theory obtainable from data of the daily
92 number of newly infected, $N(t)$, and the daily number of newly recovered, $R(t)$, by
93 subtracting the accumulated sum of $R(t)$ from the accumulated sum of $N(t)$. Analysis
94 of this accumulated quantity is sensitively affected by accumulation of poorer early
95 data of reported cases, including under-reporting and under-detection of the

96 number of infected caused by insufficient test kits, in addition to the history of
 97 changing diagnostic criteria. Moreover in practice its peak is often not detected
 98 until several weeks after it has occurred.
 99

100 Since the maximum of EIC can be located by the zero of its derivative, we propose
 101 using a local-in-time metric of $N(t_p)=R(t_p)$ at the peak of EIC , t_p . We demonstrate
 102 that for the ongoing COVID-19 epidemic, this determination of the turning point is
 103 not sensitive to past data problems, including the rather dramatic increase in $N(t)$,
 104 on 12 February, when Hubei changed its definition of “confirmed infected”. Also
 105 since it uses the newest diagnostics, with the testing facilities ramped up, hopefully
 106 the numbers are more accurate.
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114 **Figure 1.** The daily newly infected (in blue) and the daily newly recovered (in red),
 115 as a function of time for China as a whole (in solid lines) and Hubei (in dotted lines).
 116 The turning point is determined by when the red and blue curves cross.

117 **Inset:** For China outside Hubei.

118

119

120 Fig. 1 shows how this turning point is empirically determined using daily time series
 121 of reported $N(t)$ and $R(t)$. For China as whole, t_p is found to be February 18; for
 122 Hubei, the province of the epicenter Wuhan, t_p is found to be 19 February, and for
 123 China outside Hubei (China exHubei), 12 February, coincidentally on the same day
 124 as the Hubei data spike. However there is no such bump in the data outside Hubei,
 125 and so is not likely the result of the data artifact. These results, even including that

126 for Hubei, are not affected by the historical data problems because of our local-in-
127 time method for determining the turning point.

128

129 The fact that the turning point for the epidemic in China exHubei occurred earlier
130 than that for Hubei could reveal the effectiveness of the quarantine of Hubei. In
131 Wuhan, with hospitals facing the number of infected far exceeding available hospital
132 beds in the initial period, some infected patients were not adequately isolated.
133 Secondary and tertiary infections might have played a role in delaying the turning
134 point. On the other hand, outside Hubei, hospitals were not as overwhelmed
135 because of the strict quarantine placed on Hubei, which drastically reduced the
136 import of the disease originating from Hubei. The infected were better isolated,
137 reducing further spread, and treated in hospitals, resulting in shorter time to
138 recovery (see Table S1).

139

140 *EIC* corresponds to $I(t)$ in the traditional SIR (susceptible-infected-recovered)
141 model(28), if deaths are not counted in $R(t)$. Most predictions have used models
142 similar to SIR, though some current ones are much more sophisticated (12-14, 17,
143 21), but they all rely on parameters, such as contact, infection rates, time between
144 secondary and first infections, and case fatality rates. None of them are known with
145 any certainty (1). Most model predictions of the turning point have the epicenter
146 Hubei leading the rest of China by 1-2 weeks in its predicted turning point, the
147 opposite of what the data show. In many SIR types of models, an epidemic would
148 end after most people are infected and acquire immunity. These models tend to
149 have the disease run its course sooner the earlier it started.

150

151 Can such a turning point be predicted before it happened, and if so by how many
152 days in advance?

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154 **Determining the epidemiological characteristics**

155

156 We define the N to R ratio as

157

$$NR(t)=N(t)/R(t).$$


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At t_p , $NR=1$.

159

160 We show in Figure 2, using the data of the epidemic for COVID-19, that the
161 logarithm of $NR(t)$ lies on a straight line, with small scatter, passing through the
162 turning point t_p . And data for various stages of the epidemic, from the initial
163 exponential growth stage, to near the peak of *EIC*, and then past the peak, all lie on
164 the same straight line. The intercept with $\log NR=0$ yields the turning point. This
165 line, obtained by linear-least-square fit in the semi-log plot, is little affected by the
166 rather large artificial spike in the data on 12 February because of its short duration
167 and the logarithmic value. That reporting problem is necessarily of short duration
168 because, on the date of definition change, previous week's cases of infected
169 according to the new criteria were reported in one day. After that, the book is
170 cleared, and $N(t)$ returned to its normal range.

171



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174 **Figure 2.** Logarithm of the ratio of daily newly infected to newly recovered. They lie
175 on straight lines with some small scatter. The straight line obtained by linear-least
176 squares fit is in dotted line. The slopes of the lines are almost the same but with
177 different intercept; the trend lines cross zero (the black solid line) at different time
178 for different regions indicating different peaking time for *EIC*. The epicenter Wuhan
179 (green) has latest turning point than its province Hubei (pink), which has a later
180 turning point than China as a whole (cyan).

181

182 It would be interesting to understand why the empirically determined $\log NR(t)$ lies
183 on a straight line, and what determines its slope. See Method for a theoretical
184 support. For a disease with a low fatality rate, which COVID-19 is (30), most newly
185 infected individuals would eventually recover after a hospital stay of T days. So
186 $R(t) \sim N(t-T)$. This simple observation lies at the heart of our justification for the
187 straight line for $\log(NR)$. In Figures S2 and S4, this relationship is validated using
188 lagged correlation, at a very high value of 0.95. It is however not assumed in our Fig.
189 2, which is entirely empirical.

190

191 The theoretical result in Method suggests that the slope of the linear line is $-T/\sigma_2^2$,
192 where σ_2 is the standard deviation of the $R(t)$ profile. In general, the slope can be
193 different for different regions with different levels of quarantine and epidemic
194 characteristics. The hospital treatment efficacy would influence T directly, as we
195 also found. The effect of quarantine would influence the value of σ_1 , the standard
196 deviation of the newly infected, and so indirectly $R(t)$ and σ_2 . Our empirical result
197 from Fig. 2 however shows that the slope is the almost the same for different
198 regions in China, implying that efficacy of treatment and level of quarantine affect T
199 and σ^2 proportionally.

200

201 **Predictability**

202 Since the logarithm of NR lies on a straight line passing through the turning point of
203 EIC , it would be interesting to explore if the turning point can be predicted by
204 extrapolation using data weeks before it happened (see Figure S1). How far in
205 advance this can be done appears to be limited by the poor quality of the initial data.
206 Fig. 3 shows the results of such predictions (See Method). The horizontal axis
207 indicates the last date of the data used in the prediction. The beginning date of the
208 data used is 24 January for all experiments. Prior to that day, data quality was poor
209 and the newly recovered number was zero in some days, giving an infinite NR ratio.


210
211 For China outside Hubei, the prediction made on 6 February gives the turning point
212 as 14 February, two days later than the truth. A prediction made on 8 February
213 already converged to the truth of 12 February, and stays near the truth, differing by
214 no more than fractions of a day with more data.

215
216 The huge data glitch on 12 February in Hubei affected the prediction for Hubei, for
217 China as whole, and for Hubei-exWuhan. These three curves all show a bump up
218 starting 12 February, as the slope of $N(t)$ is artificially lifted. Ironically, predictions
219 made earlier than 12 February are actually better. For example, for China as a whole,
220 predictions made on 9 February and 10 February both give 19 February as the
221 turning point, only one day off the truth of 18 February. A prediction made on 11
222 February actually gives the correct turning point that would occur one week later.
223 At the time these predictions are made, the newly infected cases were rising rapidly,
224 by over 2,000 each day, and later by over 14,000. It would have been incredulous if
225 one were to announce at that time that the epidemic would turn the corner a week
226 later.

227
228 Even with the huge spike for the regions affected by the Hubei's changing of
229 diagnosis criteria, because of its short duration the artifact affects the predicted
230 value by no more than 3 days, and the prediction accuracy soon recovers for China
231 as a whole. For Hubei, the prediction never converges to the true value, but the
232 over-prediction is only 2 days. This smallness of the error is remarkable given that
233 other model predictions differ by weeks or months.

234
235 Table S1 lists the mean and standard deviation of the predictions. For applications
236 to other countries and to future epidemics without a change in the definition of the
237 "infection" to such a large extent, we expect even better prediction accuracy.

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Figure 3 Prediction of the turning point in *EIC* by extrapolating the trend in logarithm of *NR* (see Method). The horizontal axis indicates the date the prediction is made using data prior to that date. The vertical axis gives the dates of the predicted turning point. Dashed horizontal lines indicated the true dates for the turning point, as determined from Fig. 1.

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Inferring statistical characteristics of the epidemic


Interestingly, the derivative of $\log N(t)$ or $\log R(t)$ also lies on a straight line, as shown in Fig. 4 (although the scatter is larger as to be expected for any differentiation of empirical data). The positive and negative outliers one day before and after 12 Feb are caused by the spike up and then down, with little effect on the fitted linear trend (but increases its variance and therefore uncertainty). Moreover, the straight line extends without appreciable change in slope beyond the peak of $N(t)$, suggesting that the distribution of the newly infected number is approximately Gaussian. For an exponential function, the derivative of its logarithm being a linear function of time is highly suggestive of a general type of distribution including Gaussian and Rayleigh. The recovery time T can be determined as $t_1 - t_0$, where t_1 is the peak of $R(t)$ and t_0 is the peak of $N(t)$. These two peak times can be obtained by extending the straight line in Fig. 4 to intersect the zero line. This predicted result can be verified statistically after the fact by the lagged correlation of $R(t)$ and $N(t)$. If the distribution is indeed Gaussian or even approximately so, the slope in Fig. 4 would be proportional to the reciprocal of the square of its standard deviation, σ , as:

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$$\frac{d \log N(t)}{dt} = \frac{-(t - t_0)}{\sigma_1^2}$$

Similarly result holds for the daily number of recovered, $R(t)$.

268 The inferred statistical characteristics of the Covid-19 epidemic are summarized in
 269 Table S2 for various regions. The mean recovery time T , is about 13 days for China
 270 as a whole. For Wuhan, the city at the epicenter whose hospitals were more
 271 overwhelmed and the patients admitted into hospitals more seriously ill than those
 272 in other provinces, $T \sim 16$ days, while that for Hubei is 14 days. The standard
 273 deviation, σ , is found to be around 8 days, with slight difference between that for
 274 $N(t)$ and for $R(t)$, with one exception for Hubei outside Wuhan. Such a fine
 275 subdivision may not be practical for the data quality we have. The σ tends to be
 276 smaller for China as a whole than Wuhan. One can see that T and σ^2 indeed varying
 277 approximately in proportion.
 278



279 **Figure 4** The derivative of the logarithm of daily newly infected or recovered.
 280 Notice the clear separation of the new and recovered cases and also the subtle
 281 difference of their slopes. The zero crossings of the trend line give the peak dates of
 282 the new and recovered case respectively. And the slopes give an estimate of σ
 283 values. In this Figure, the following abbreviations are used: C=China; H=Hubei;
 284 N=New Case; R=Recovered.
 285

286
 287 **Estimate of “all clear” declaration**

288 We can now estimate a time for a declaration of “all clear”. No verification is yet
 289 possible as the predicted date has not occurred. At the turning point, the EIC is still
 290 at its peak. For the disease to have run its course, and an “all clear” declaration can
 291 be announced, we require that the newly infected case number to drop to zero, for
 292 prediction practice measured by three standard deviations from the peak of $N(t)$.
 293 Then we wait for two incubation periods, each 14 days, to pass, before we declare

294 “all clear”. Using the inferred disease characteristics in Table S1, our prediction is,
295 for China outside Hubei: the last week of March. For China as a whole: the first week
296 of April, barring “imports” of infected from abroad. At this point there may still be
297 some patients in the hospital who are infected with the virus. The “all clear” call
298 assumes that these patients are not roaming freely to cause new infections.

299

300 **South Korea**

301 Finally, we apply the present approach the still expanding outbreak in South Korea,
302 with very limited data. We estimate that the turning point for *EIC* is on March 11.
303 See Method. An estimate of the end of the epidemic can be given as the second week
304 of April, using the estimated value for $t_0 = 3$ March, $\sigma = 4.5$ days. Remarkably, this date
305 is around the same time as for Wuhan, China. South Korea owes its quick turning
306 point and end of the epidemic date to its ability to identify the first infection and the
307 secondary infections at Shincheonji Church (31), where most of the infected were
308 concentrated. This is reflected in the data: σ for South Korea is only half that of
309 China, with a more rapid rise and fall of the newly infected. Its data for the newly
310 infected are probably more accurate compared to other countries in similar stage of
311 the epidemic, due to its massive and speedy (within 6 hours) testing of the
312 population in its “trace, test and treat” policy.

313

314 **Conclusion.**

315 We offer an alternative data-driven approach to track and predict the course of the
316 epidemic. Many parameters characterizing an epidemic can be determined from
317 local-in-time data. Validated by real data, we suggest that our approach could be
318 applied not just to the current Covid-19 epidemic, but also generally to future
319 epidemics of low fatality rates. It could also be used as a practical tool for epidemic
320 management decisions such as quarantine institution and medical resource
321 planning and allocations (32-35).

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327 **METHOD**

328

329 **Theoretical support:**

330 The NR ratio is defined as:

331

332
$$NR(t) = \frac{N(t)}{R(t)} .$$

333

334 For an epidemic like COVID-19, where the case fatality rate is low (at around 1%),
335 most of the infected would eventually recover; therefore, we have, as will be verified
336 later:

337
$$R(t) = N(t-T) ; NR(t) = \frac{N(t)}{N(t-T)} ,$$

338

339 where T is the hospital stay period before recovery, with its value governed by the
340 efficacy of the treatment. Using real data, we show that this ratio follows a straight-
341 line trend. To explain this intriguing feature, we find theoretical support based on
342 Gaussian distributions for the daily new and recovered case numbers. Gaussian
343 distribution is a simple and reasonable form for a distribution that has a single peak,
344 with rapid rise, plateauing near the peak and then declining rapidly. Later, we will
345 verify using actual data for China that they are indeed very close to Gaussian.

346

$$NR(t) = \frac{N(t)}{N(t-T)} = \frac{\exp\left\{-\frac{1}{2\sigma^2}(t-t_0)^2\right\}}{\exp\left\{-\frac{1}{2\sigma^2}(t-t_0-T)^2\right\}} ; \text{ therefore,}$$

347

$$\log NR(t) = -\left\{\frac{(t-t_0)^2}{2\sigma^2} - \frac{(t-t_0-T)^2}{2\sigma^2}\right\} = -\frac{2T(t-t_0)-T^2}{2\sigma^2}$$

348

349 a linear function of t . The intercept with 0 yields $t_p = t_0 + \frac{1}{2}T$.

350

351 In reality, the distribution is only approximately Gaussian, of course. But the
352 approximation is very close for the central part of the distribution near the peak. In
353 fact, central limit theory would favor a Gaussian distribution when the data base is
354 large.

355

356 Empirically, we find that the σ value for $N(t)$ and $R(t)$ are close to each other but
357 slight differences exist, as shown in Table S2. This is to be expected, for even though
358 the new and recovered case happen in tandem with former leading the latter, the
359 hospital treatment and stay constitute effectively a smoothing filter on $N(t)$ to
360 produce $R(t)$. The hospital process tends to spread the $R(t)$ distribution wider, thus

361 yield a slightly larger σ values. Given the scatter of the differentiation done for
 362 Figure 4 to infer individual distribution characteristics, the difference may or may
 363 not be significant. More data from various regions under different conditions may
 364 resolve this problem in the future. Taking this difference into account the form of
 365 real NR should be modified to be:

$$NR(t) = \frac{N(t)}{N(t-T)} = \frac{\exp\left\{-\frac{1}{2\sigma_1^2}(t-t_0)^2\right\}}{\exp\left\{-\frac{1}{2\sigma_2^2}(t-t_0-T)^2\right\}} ; \text{ therefore,}$$

$$\log NR = -\left\{\frac{(t-t_0)^2}{2\sigma_1^2} - \frac{(t-t_0-T)^2}{2\sigma_2^2}\right\} = -\frac{(\sigma_2^2 - \sigma_1^2)(t-t_0)^2 + 2\sigma_1^2 T(t-t_0) - \sigma_1^2 T^2}{2\sigma_1^2 \sigma_2^2}$$

367
 368 As the values of σ_1 and σ_2 are very close based on the empirical data, the quadratic
 369 term is always small comparing to the other terms for the length of time we are
 370 considering here. Hence.

$$\log NR(t) = \frac{1}{\sigma_2^2} \{-Tt + T^2\} : \text{ a linear function of time.}$$

372

$$\therefore \frac{d \log NR(t)}{dt} = \frac{-T}{\sigma_2^2} \quad \text{almost constant}$$

373

374 The turning point is still determined by $\log NR=0$, yielding a theoretical value of
 375 $t_p=t_0+T/2$. This theoretical value can be used when the data on $R(t)$ is not available.

376

377 If the daily data is indeed near Gaussian, then for the daily newly infected cases, we
 378 should have approximately,

379

$$N(t) = \exp\left\{-\frac{(t-t_0)^2}{2\sigma_1^2}\right\} ; \text{ therefore,}$$

380

$$\log N(t) = \frac{-(t-t_0)^2}{2\sigma_1^2} \quad \text{and} \quad \frac{d \log N(t)}{dt} = -\frac{(t-t_0)}{\sigma_1^2}.$$

381 The same is true for the recovered cases, except with t_1 replacing t_0 and σ_2 replacing

382 σ_1 .

383

384 Importantly, the real data indeed validate a near-straight line function for NR
 385 throughout all phase of the epidemic, and the near-Gaussian distributions for both
 386 $N(t)$ and $R(t)$. Straight line functions are easy to extend and making predictions easy
 387 and robust. These properties also enable us to infer many of the key statistical

388 characteristics of the epidemic from empirical data, such as the turning point,
389 peaking times t_0 and t_1 and the σ of the distributions from the formulas given above.

390

391 There are some subtle points that need to be discussed further. Comparing the NR
392 ratio approach and the derivative of individual distribution approach, we can see
393 that the NR ratio is much smoother; however, the derivative of individual
394 distribution is richer in information for predicting the 'all clear' time shown later.

395

396 **Validation**

397 **a. Lagged correlation**

398 First, we validate statistically using lagged correlation between $N(t)$ and $R(t)$ the
399 relationship between the two. Figures S2 and S4 show that they are highly
400 correlated: with correlation coefficient of 0.95 when both distributions are
401 smoothed with 5-point box car. The unsmoothed daily data also yield a high
402 correlation coefficient of 0.80, with $R(t)$ lags $N(t)$ by $T \sim 15$ days. Both of the
403 correlation coefficients are statistically significant. The result on T is consistent
404 with that estimated or predicted using the slope of the distribution in Figure 4. The
405 latter, obtained by the intercept of the straight line, is less accurate because of the
406 slope is rather shallow.

407

408 **b. Gaussian distribution**

409 A Gaussian distribution is completely characterized by the location of the peak and
410 the standard deviation. These quantities are determined from the slopes in Figure 4,
411 and therefore there are no free parameters. Even without the use of disposable
412 parameters, the fit of Gaussian to the actual distribution is adequate, as can be seen
413 in Figure S3. The corresponding correlation and Gaussian fits for Hubei province
414 are given in Figures S4 and S5.

415

416 **c. EIC**

417 EIC is the accumulated newly infected minus the accumulated recovered. Given the
418 result in **a**, a simpler calculation can be performed which avoids the early poor data:
419

420

$$\begin{aligned} EIC(t) &= \int_{-\infty}^t N(t) dt - \int_{-\infty}^t R(t) dt = \int_{-\infty}^t N(t) dt - \int_{-\infty}^t N(t-T) dt \\ &= \int_{t-T}^t N(t) dt. \end{aligned}$$

421

422 That is, to find EIC at time t , one only needs to add up the daily newly infected case
423 numbers for a period of T preceding t . This is an almost local-in-time property even
424 for this accumulated quantity. For validation, we estimate the peak of the EIC
425 number on 18 February by computing the sum of daily newly infected case numbers
426 for 15 days, from February 4 to February 18, which yields an EIC on 18 February of
427 54,747. This is within 10% of the actual number of 57,805, even after taking into
428 account the deaths (by subtracting the accumulated deaths of 2,004 from our
429 estimate).

429

430 **Estimating the end date of the epidemic:**

431

432 From the σ and T numbers, one can make predictions on the end of the epidemic as
433 follows. There are two different definitions:

434

435 ***1st End date of the epidemic = $t_0+3\sigma+2*$ incubation period.***

436

437 ***2nd End date of the epidemic = $t_1+3\sigma+2*$ incubation period.***

438

439 The first one depends on the newly infected case, the second one, on the daily cured
440 cases. If we take the incubation time as 14 days, the end of the epidemic outbreak
441 can be calculated easily from the data given in Table S1. Based on our analysis,
442 Wuhan would come out of the epidemic the latest, long after the rest of the country,
443 at around

444

445 ***1st: February 11 + 3x8 +2x14 or towards the beginning of April.***

446

447 ***2nd: February 24+ 3x8 +2x14 or towards the middle of April.***

448

449 The estimate based on the first definition is reported in the main text..

450

450 **South Korea:**

451 Finally, we will show how this method is applied to the expanding outbreak in South
452 Korea. Figure S6 summarized the available data at the present. The recovered case
453 numbers hovered around 1 and 2 daily up to March 1st. It only picked up toward the
454 end. Starting from 19 February, there seems to be enough new daily infected cases.
455 All these phenomena are not random events, for the South Korea Government has
456 identified that the epic center of the epidemic is at church gathering in the city of
457 Daegu and North Gyeongsang province, where 90% of the cases are found.
458 Specifically, a confirmed COVID-19 patient was reported to have attend the
459 Shincheonji Church of Jesus services twice on February 9th and 16th. Given the
460 incubation period of 7 to 14 days, the initial explosion at February 19th and the first
461 peak value around February 24th are not accidents.

462

463 If we use the available daily new cases data, we can get the statistical characteristics
464 of the distribution of the daily new cases from Figure S7, which gives the t_0 as March
465 3rd and a σ value of 4.5 days. If we further use the turning point as approximately
466 $t_0+T/2$, then the turning point should fall on March 10, assuming T as 14 days based
467 on the over all mean from different regions in China.

468

469 For the NR ratio, it is limited by the availability of recovered case number. If we use
470 the limited recovered cases starting from March 1st, we have 7 days of data. The
471 computed the NR ratio together with the trend is given in Figure S8. The turning
472 point, at the zero-crossing of the extended trend line, would occur between March
473 11th and 12th. This approach does not need to use a value for T .

474

475 It should be pointed out that the Korean data available is only marginal. The
476 predicted date of turning point by *NR* ratio would be between March 11th and 12th;
477 by the derivative of distribution it would be March 10th. The result is not only
478 consistent, but also validated by real data showing the turning point on March 12th,
479 a pleasant surprise.

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601 **Competing Interests:** The authors declare no competing interests.

602 **Data Availability:** All data in this study are publicly available from World Health
603 Organization (WHO) at [https://www.who.int/emergencies/diseases/novel-](https://www.who.int/emergencies/diseases/novel-coronavirus-2019/situation-reports/)
604 [coronavirus-2019/situation-reports/](https://www.who.int/emergencies/diseases/novel-coronavirus-2019/situation-reports/)

605 and on the Daily Brief site of the China's National Health Commission at
606 <http://en.nhc.gov.cn/>

607 The Korean data is available at

608 <https://sa.sogou.com/new-weball/page/sgs/epidemic>


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
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614 **Supplementary Information:**
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
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Figure S1. Prediction of the turning point of EIC using linear least-squares trends using various data lengths for China exHubei. All data used start from 24 January. Different colored straight lines show the linear trend calculated from 24 January to a particular date. The spread is over a very small range. Then these trends are extrapolated (extrapolations not shown) to intersect the zero line to yield a prediction for the turning point. The blue dots are the data.




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Figure S2. Lagged correlation of $R(t)$ with $N(t)$ for China as a whole.




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Figure S3. Gaussian fit of $N(t)$ and $R(t)$, for China as a whole.



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Figure S4. Lagged correlation of $R(t)$ with $N(t)$ for Hubei province.



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Figure S5. Gaussian fit of $N(t)$ and $R(t)$, for Hubei Province.

	China	Hubei	China-Hubei	Hubei-Wuhan
Truth (data)	18	19	12	15
NR Ratio	20.3±1.6 (Feb 20 nd)	22.3±1.0 (Feb 22 rd)	12.4±0.9 (Feb 12 th)	16.0±1.2 (Feb 16 th)


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Table S1: Predicted turning point dates. Shown are the mean and standard deviation of the predictions over the prediction period, using the NR ratio method

	Crossing	t_0	t_1	T	Sigma N	Sigma R
China	2/18	2/11	2/24	13	7.5	7.7
Hubei	2/20	2/12	2/26	14	7.9	8.5
Wuhan	2/21	2/14	3/01	16	8.8	8.8
C exHubei	2/12	2/08	2/21	13	7.5	7.1
H exWuhan	2/16	2/13	2/27	14	5.0	8.8


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Table S2: Statistical characteristics of the COVID-19 epidemic in different regions in China inferred from data, for $N(t)$, the daily number of newly infected and for $R(t)$, the daily number of recovered.




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Figure S6: The available data from South Korea (as of March 7th). The sporadic recovered case numbers are mostly in the single digit. If we use the sudden increase of recovered case matching with the sudden explosive increase of new infected, the distance is approximately 14 days, a reasonable T value when compared to the mean value in China. For our data analysis, we used daily newly cases starting February 19th, for the derivative of individual distribution study; we used data case from March 1st, for the NR ratio study, in order to have enough recovered cases.



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Figure S7: The derivative of the logarithmic value of daily new infected case distribution.



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665 **Figure S8:** The *NR* ratio from 7 days of data from March 1st to 7th. The estimated
666 zero-crossing time would occur between March 11th and 12th, a value consistent
667 with the statistics from the daily new case distribution on March 10th.
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