

1 **The COVID-19 infection in Italy: a statistical study of an abnormally severe**  
2 **disease.**

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19  
20 **Abstract**

21 We statistically investigate the COVID-19 epidemics, which is particularly invasive in Italy. We  
22 show that the high apparent mortality (or Case Fatality Ratio, CFR) observed in Italy, as compared  
23 with other countries, is likely biased by a strong underestimation of infected cases. To give a more  
24 realistic estimate of the mortality of Covid-19, we use the most recent estimates of the IFR  
25 (Infection Fatality Ratio) of epidemic, based on CFR for Germany, and furthermore analyse data  
26 obtained from the ship 'Diamond Princess', a good representation of a 'laboratory' case-study from  
27 an isolated system in which all the people have been tested. From such analyses we try to derive  
28 more realistic estimates of the real extension of the infection, as well as more accurate indicators of  
29 how fast the infection propagates. We then try to point out, from the various explanations proposed,  
30 the dominant factors causing such an abnormal seriousness of the disease in Italy. Finally, we use  
31 the deceased data, the only ones estimated to be reliable enough, to predict the total number of  
32 infected people and the interval of time when the infection in Italy could stop.

33

## 34 **Introduction**

35

36 The infection of COVID-19, recently declared pandemic by WHO, represents perhaps one of the  
37 most serious Worldwide emergencies, potentially able to destroy social order and economies and to  
38 deeply change our lifestyle in the near future. The epidemics was firstly detected in China, in the  
39 city of Wuhan, at the end of December 2019; about 45 days after (mid-February 2020), it started to  
40 seriously affect several other countries (South Korea among the firsts). Since the end of February, it  
41 flared up in Italy and, since mid-March 2020, the epidemics was spread all over Europe, in the  
42 USA, Iran and many other countries (Worldometers, 2020).

43 Since the first appearance of this new Coronavirus (Worldometers, 2020), the COVID-19 infection  
44 has been treated with very mixed feelings: from just a disease a little more serious than a seasonal  
45 flu, to a very severe and troubling affliction. After some interlocutory days, the government of  
46 China showed serious concern and implemented very severe measures in the Hubei province, the  
47 centre of the epidemics, to contain the epidemic spreading of the infection. Around mid-February,  
48 among the most affected countries, besides China, there were South Korea, a rather natural  
49 candidate as bordering China, and then Italy and Iran, for less clear reasons. After one further  
50 month the epidemic appeared to have spread worldwide.

51 Here we want to focus on the COVID-19 epidemic in Italy that shows some peculiar features,  
52 distinguishing its evolution from the one observed in other countries. The epidemic appears very  
53 aggressive, both in terms of spread rate and mortality, which are however very uncertain parameters  
54 for this new virus.

55 In Italy, the infection is mainly focused in the Lombardia Region and the area around the Po river.  
56 The most affected regions are Lombardia, Emilia -Romagna and Veneto, which also represent the  
57 richest and more productive part of Italy. In Italy, the infection grew very fast, overcoming South  
58 Korea in the number of infected people as early as in the beginning of March 2020, today (March  
59 25th, 2020) reaching 74.386 total infections. Moreover, it showed an average Case Fatality Ratio  
60 (CFR) over 9%, well above any other country and more than double with respect to the Hubei  
61 Region in China, where the new virus first appeared, and where CFR was significantly higher than  
62 in other parts of the China and higher than many other countries in the World.

63 In this paper, we will show statistical analyses of data associated to the Italian Covid-19 epidemics.  
64 The aim is to estimate a possible slowdown of the infection and also to understand our statistical  
65 predictions in relation with the severe containment measures taken by the Italian Government. We  
66 discuss alternative explanations for the very high CFR observed. To confront with the important  
67 problem of determining the true mortality (Infection Fatality Ratio, IFR) of the epidemics, we use

68 the study of an isolated, well calibrated test case, represented by the infection spread on the  
69 ‘Diamond Princess’ cruise ship.

70 Mortality (IFR) estimates obtained within the ‘Diamond Princess’ are an ‘unbiased’ value, not  
71 affected by the underestimation of the number of infected people; also IFR values computed by the  
72 University of Oxford (Oke and Henegan, 2020) from Germany data were checked. Using various  
73 IFR estimations, we predict a much larger number of infected people in Italy with respect to the  
74 official one, suggesting that the CFR highly overestimates true mortality. We also discuss the  
75 likelihood of alternative hypotheses, often claimed to explain the high impact of Covid-19 in Italy,  
76 based on the influence of old average age of population, high antibiotic resistance, high number of  
77 smokers, pollution in the Po plain (e.g. Oke and Henegan, 2020).

78 Finally, we identify the best data set to analyse the statistical evolution of the epidemics in Italy,  
79 also comparing it with its prototypical behaviour obtained from the China dataset, to try to forecast  
80 the time of saturation of the infection.

81

## 82 **The COVID-19 in Italy**

83

84 The COVID-19 epidemic in Italy presents some peculiarities that make it very intriguing to analyse  
85 and understand. Initially it was thought that two independent focuses started in Codogno (15.962  
86 inhabitants, Lodi province, Lombardia region) and Vò Euganeo (3416 inhabitants, Padua province,  
87 Veneto region) towns, but it is now generally understood that the virus started circulating earlier in  
88 the whole north of Italy. The epidemic rapidly blew up all over Italy, but particularly around the Po  
89 Valley, in Lombardia, Veneto and Emilia Romagna. These Regions are the richest ones in Italy, for  
90 their industries, agriculture in the Po Valley and international commerce. The Lombardia and the Po  
91 Valley, the most hit by the infection, are also the most polluted areas in Italy and probably also the  
92 most polluted in the whole Europe by the fine air particulate matter (PM10, PM2.5) and Ozone  
93 (Martuzzi et al., 2006.; Stafoggia et al., 2009).

94 The beginning and evolution of COVID-19 infection in Italy, and more specifically in Lombardia  
95 region, is from many points of view anomalous and highly lethal, with respect to all other countries  
96 worldwide, including China where the infection was born.

97 Although all the media (and also many specialists interviewed by media) highlight the velocity of  
98 infection in Italy as ‘exponential’, the number of infected people has never followed an exponential  
99 distribution, except in the very first few days. Figure 1a shows the number of recorded infections as  
100 a function of time (in days since February 24th 2020) in a semi-logarithmic scale. It is evident that  
101 the distribution is markedly different from a straight line, typical of an exponential distribution in

102 such a scale, and it's rather well fitted by a cubic polynomial (much slower than exponential), or by  
103 a logistic function, also present in the figure. Figure 1b shows the same quantity in a linear scale,  
104 together with the three mentioned fitting functions..

105 Although the number of infected people is the main parameter taken into account by the authorities,  
106 and the most highlighted by media, its real value is largely uncertain, and surely underestimated. In  
107 fact, it critically depends from the number of laboratory tests made on people to ascertain the  
108 infection, which is anyway limited and very small as compared with the number of inhabitants.  
109 Furthermore, the procedure to test people are highly variable within the different Regions of Italy  
110 and have changed over time in the last weeks; because of this inconsistency, this number is  
111 statistically very inhomogeneous and unfit to to interpret the actual evolution of the infection.

112 The number of tests in Italy, highly fluctuating but generally increasing in time except in the last  
113 days ranged from about 2.427 (February 27th) to 26.336 (March 21st), and decreased again to  
114 25180 (March 22nd) and 17.066 (March 23rd) (Il Sole 24 Ore, 2020). A very important quantity,  
115 namely the CFR, defined as the ratio of number of people deceased divided by number of total  
116 recorded infections, is extremely high in Italy (about 9%). Such a high value is dominated by the  
117 mortality in Lombardia, where about 50% of all the Italian infections have been recorded, with a  
118 CFR of about 11%. CFR is a generally overestimated value of the true mortality (IFR), given the  
119 likely underestimation of the real number of infection cases (i.e. including asymptomatic and pauci-  
120 symptomatic cases, which are easily overlooked by the small number of tests). IFR is the parameter  
121 which measure the percentage of deceases over the total population infected (including the  
122 generally unknown number of non recorded cases). Table 1(Oke and Henegan, 2020) reports the  
123 number of infections and CFR observed in several countries in the world. It is possible to note that  
124 the mortality rate for different countries is very variable, going from a minimum of 0.4% (i.e.  
125 Germany, Australia, Austria) to a maximum of 9% in Italy. Several observations are however  
126 around 1%-2% (Denmark, USA, Portugal, Belgium, etc.). It appears evident, therefore, that the  
127 CFR of Italy, and even more of Lombardia region, is absolutely extreme when compared to any  
128 other country. This CFR is more than double of the CFR obtained in China, where the epidemic  
129 first appeared. Therefore, besides CFR, it is important to obtain a reasonable estimation of the IFR  
130 already during the epidemic spread, to understand the real hazard of the disease and/or to estimate  
131 the real amount of infected people.

132

### 133 **The IFR for COVID-19 and the mortality in Italy**

134

135 The problem of unbiased estimation of the IFR for COVID-19 is complicated by the complex  
136 laboratory procedures that are necessary to identify the infected cases, ultimately limiting the total  
137 number of tested individuals. Since the IFR is the ratio between the number of deceased due to the  
138 disease and the total number of infected, the CFR, which is computed on the number of ‘known’  
139 infected is an upper limit of IFR. Normally, CFR (and hence IFR) should be determined at the end  
140 of epidemic, because decrease occurs at the end of the epidemic cycle, delayed with respect to the  
141 infection. At the very beginning of epidemic, the CFR could be underestimated just because the  
142 outcome of the disease (recovered or deceased) has not yet been reached. For COVID-19, however,  
143 it was noted in China (and in South Korea too) that CFR was generally higher in the first phase of  
144 the infection spreading. A further problem is that the amount of underestimated infected cases is  
145 generally variable, and could become progressively more critical as the real number of infected  
146 rapidly rises with time, while the number of tests remains stationary. From Table 1, it is clear that  
147 each country has a very variable CFR associated to the COVID-19 infection. Since the IFR is  
148 intrinsically overestimated by the CFR, assuming the virus strain is the same in every country, we  
149 can assume the minimum value of the observed CFR as the minimum upper limit for IFR.  
150 Following this procedure, the University of Oxford (Oke and Henegan, 2020) used one of the  
151 minimum CFR values, namely from Germany (CFR=0.4%) obtained in a rather initial phase, and  
152 halved it, then computing IFR=0.2%.

153 For the COVID-19 epidemics, there is an independent way to obtain a rather unbiased estimate of  
154 IFR using the only ‘laboratory-like’ case study: the ‘Diamond Princess’, the cruise ship anchored in  
155 the port of Yokohama from February 4th to March 2nd. Among the 3711 passengers, 705 were  
156 found infected, and 7 of them died. This is the only perfectly isolated case in which all the people  
157 have been tested, so that the number of infected ones is perfectly known. The IFR=CFR computed  
158 from the ‘Diamond Princess’ is then slightly less than 1%. Although statistically affected by a  
159 rather large uncertainty due to the small number of deceased, we can then assume that the IFR of  
160 COVID-19 is around 1%; the observation of a CFR significantly smaller than 1% (i.e. Germany,  
161 Norway, Australia, Austria, Ireland) indicate that, within the unknown uncertainty of the ‘Diamond  
162 Princess’ IFR, lower values are more probable than larger ones. In the light of such mortality range  
163 (less than 1%), it appears very abnormal the observed CFR in Italy (9%), and even more the CFR in  
164 the Lombardia Region (11%).

165 In the following, we will try to point out the possible explanations for such an extremely anomalous  
166 outcome. We will, again, assume that the virus strain is the same in every country, since there are

167 not contrary evidences till now. The first, more obvious reason to explain such a high mortality, is  
168 to hypothesize that the number of infected cases is substantially underestimated. A clear sign of this  
169 is the fact that mortality increases during time, from around 2% at the beginning (February 20th) to  
170 9% on March 20th. During this period the number of detected cases rose from few units to 47.000,  
171 whereas the daily number of laboratory tests changed from few hundreds to about 26.000.

172 Besides the CFR, which is only linked to the recorded infection cases, what is really interesting to  
173 understand is a ‘local’ IFR estimation for Italy, in order to derive the real total number of infected  
174 people. Lacking evidence for the existence of a different virus strain, more aggressive and lethal in  
175 Italy, we firstly assume that IFR is the same as in other places, and a distinctive trait of this  
176 epidemic. We could then choose between the University of Oxford estimate of IFR=0.2%, or the  
177 ‘Diamond Princess’ laboratory-like estimation of IFR=1%.

178 If the extreme mortality observed would be only due to the underestimation of the number of  
179 infected people, assuming a ‘true’ IFR ranging between 0.2% and 1%, to correct for the Italian 9%  
180 CFR, we should multiply, respectively, by 45 or by 9 the official number of infected cases (74.386  
181 on March 25th); the resulting number then ranges between about 670.000 and about 3.3 million  
182 infected people.

183 We cannot exclude, however, the true IFR in Italy to be significantly higher than in other countries  
184 because of several concurrent reasons. For instance, the higher average age of Italian people has  
185 often been indicated as a possible explanation for the high COVID-19 CFR. Among all the  
186 countries of the World, Italy is actually in the second position for higher average age; however, the  
187 first position (oldest population) is occupied by Japan, which showed a very low number of  
188 infections and CFR (see Table 1) so that this possibility appears unlikely.

189 Another possible cause of comorbidity could be found in the high level of pollution in Lombardia  
190 region that is likely the most polluted region in Europe by fine particulate (PM10, PM2.5) and  
191 Ozone. As shown in several papers (e.g. Chen et al., 2010; Ye et al., 2016; Chen et al., 2017; Setti  
192 et al., 2020) there is a correlation between the diffusion of viruses and the pollution by fine  
193 particulate. Furthermore, exposition to fine powders contributes to enhance the severity for  
194 respiratory viral infections (Dominici et al., 2006; Cienciewicki and Jaspers, 2007). The incidence of  
195 fine particulate pollution could hence, in principle, be one of the reasons for the high mortality rate  
196 observed in Lombardia (and partially in Emilia Romagna, around the Po Plain). Although an effect  
197 of this kind of pollution in amplifying the mortality observed for a severe pulmonary disease seems  
198 reasonable, it is actually very difficult to quantify its incidence, and is difficult to believe it can be  
199 so strong with respect to other highly industrialized areas of Europe (e.g. Germany, France, UK,  
200 Netherlands, etc.). Moreover, a recent document issued by the Italian Aerosol Society, signed by

201 about 60 scientists of various disciplines, rejects the hypotheses (Setti et al., 2020), pointing out that  
202 there is no clear evidence for a correlation between fine particulate and COVID-19 disease  
203 amplification (Contini et al., 2020).

204 Other tentative explanations for the extreme mortality were the high number of smokers in Italy and  
205 the antibiotic-resistance of Italian people (Oke and Henegan, 2020). However, regarding the  
206 percentage of smoking people, Italy's 23% is lower than the European average, 29% (WHO, 2016);  
207 regarding the antibiotic-resistance, on the contrary, Italy has actually the most critical position in  
208 Europe. Among about 33,000 yearly deceases in EU due to antibiotic-resistant bacteria, about  
209 10,000 occur in Italy alone (ISS, 2019). Since generally therapies used against the Cov-SARS-2  
210 involve one or more antibiotics, this issue could, in principle, result in higher mortality. Also in this  
211 case, however, it is not easy to quantify this effect, which however appears marginal in seasonal flu,  
212 since in this case CFR for Italy does not differ too much with respect to other European countries  
213 (ISS, 2019). Moreover, during Covid-19 antibiotics administration aims to avoid bacterial  
214 superinfection, whose mortality is negligible; so even if there was a more pronounced antibiotic  
215 resistance and this mechanism would be implied in higher mortality, this would probably account  
216 for only a very little part of the deaths. The remaining possibility is that the healthcare was  
217 unprepared for such an emergency due to a respiratory syndrome; actually, we just note that in Italy  
218 (60 million people), there were, before COVID-19 epidemic, about 5090 places in intensive care  
219 units (ICU); for comparison in Germany (82 million people) such places were 28.000. Actually, in  
220 terms of number of ICU divided by population, Italy occupies the 19th position among 23 European  
221 Countries. We observe indeed high pressure on ICU by severe/critical cases, mainly in Lombardia,  
222 where the number of ICU before the crisis was 900; this number increased to over 1000, but, at the  
223 moment (March 25th), the patients hosted in ICU are more than 1200, and, since March 14<sup>th</sup>, the  
224 Government of Lombardia already declared that available ICU were almost over. Another  
225 indication that something went wrong during the first phase of management of the infection by the  
226 Lombardia Hospitals is the very high number (6.205) of infected medical staff (ISS daily Info,  
227 March 25<sup>th</sup>). So, the Hospitals could have been the most effective carriers for the epidemic in the  
228 first phase in Lombardia, when a very fast exponential increase was observed.

229

### 230 **Possible forecast of future behaviour of infection**

231

232 In order to forecast the evolution and end of the COVID-19 epidemic in Italy, we could in principle  
233 use three kinds of data. The most obvious would be the daily infection data. However, such data are  
234 particularly unreliable, because too much dependent from the daily number of tests. They are

235 generally very variable and inhomogeneous, both from a Region to another, and also in time. Since,  
236 as we noted, the real number of infected people is likely much higher (orders of magnitude) with  
237 respect to the sampled one, the inhomogeneous sampling can strongly condition the number of  
238 infections, making them not useful for a statistical study. Another possible indicator of the epidemic  
239 evolution is the number of people in Intensive Care Units (ICU). Contrarily to the number of  
240 infected, the number of people in ICU should be objective, because who has serious breathing  
241 problems must necessarily be hospitalized in ICU. However, in this phase of the epidemic crisis,  
242 this number has two problems: the first one is that, at least in Lombardia which however dominates  
243 the statistics, ICU places are mostly full, so not all people requiring them can be allocated. The  
244 second problem is that the daily numbers given by Civil Protection just mention the total number of  
245 people hosted in ICUs in that day, and not the daily incremental number. Hence, it is not possible to  
246 know the real cumulative number of people hosted in ICUs, because we don't know how many  
247 people each day came out from them, due to recovering or death.

248 The only quantity which has a rather rigorous statistical meaning, then, is the daily cumulative  
249 number of deceases. We then choose to use this number in order to statistically analyse the  
250 evolution of epidemic and to predict its end. Obviously, since we are particularly interested in  
251 determining the time at which the epidemic ends and the total number of infected people cumulated  
252 at the end of the epidemic, we have to correctly consider the relation of the daily cumulative  
253 number of deceases with the cumulative number of infected people. The number of deceased people  
254 is linked to the number of infected one by the  $IFR=D/I$  ( $D$ = deceased,  $I$ =infected); then, correcting  
255 the number of deceases for the constant factor represented by the inverse of IFR ( $I/D$ ) gives the  
256 number of infected people. However, we must also consider that infection and decease are the two  
257 temporal limits of the disease: it starts with infection, proceeds with the symptoms, and then ends  
258 with one of the two possibilities: recovering or death. For doing so, we must consider the shift in  
259 time between the infection and the decease. For COVID-19, it can be estimated that the average  
260 time from infection to death is 16 days ((Jung et al., 2020). With such relations in mind between  
261 infected and deceased people, we fit the decease data to a logistic function of the general

262 form:  $y(t) = K \frac{1+me^{-t/\tau}}{1+qe^{-t/\tau}}$

263 Fig.2 shows the fit we made, using a logistic function, to the epidemic curve of the cumulative daily  
264 number of cases (infections) reported in the whole China, Hubei province and China without Hubei  
265 province. It is clear how, in the case of an epidemic already ended, so describing the whole  
266 epidemic behaviour from the start to the end, the logistic function gives a good fit to the process. In  
267 our case, as we explained, we are using the cumulative daily number of deceases to fit the logistic



268 function, simply because is a much more reliable quantity when compared to the total reported  
269 cases..

270 In order to convert from cumulative number of deceases to cumulative number of infections, we use  
271 several tentative values of IFR: the one computed by University of Oxford, IFR=0.2%; the one  
272 computed from the mortality on the Diamond Princess, IFR=1%; and one much larger, in case the  
273 IFR for Italy would be much larger than in other countries, IFR=5%. Such a large range of IFR for  
274 conversion is useful to check the range of times of saturation, and obviously of the final amount of  
275 total infections.

276 Fig.3 shows the fits of the deceased data (black data points) reported in Italy with a logistic  
277 function. It is clear the logistic model gives a good fit to these data.

278 Fig.4 shows the fit of the estimated amount of total cases, by multiplying the daily number of  
279 deceases by the assumed IFR. The different logistic curves (blue, red and green), present in the  
280 figure, are the estimated number of contagious people for the different IFR values of 0.2%, 1% and  
281 5%, respectively. From these values we also subtract the number of cases reported by Italian  
282 authorities to estimate the number of unreported contagious cases (cyan, pink, light green). It is  
283 evident that the number of reported cases is only a minor fraction of the estimated number of  
284 contagious people. In particular, for an IFR of 0.2%, 1% and 5% we estimate a total number of  
285 cases at March 25th (30 days from the beginning of the epidemics) of about 3.3 million, 670,000  
286 and 134,000 depending on the value of the IFR. With a total number of reported cases in the order  
287 of 75000, Italy might be strongly underestimating the total number of infected people (including  
288 asymptomatic and pauci-symptomatic persons) of 98.6%, 93.2% or 66.2% depending on the IFR.  
289 From the time dependence of the logistic function, we observe that in all cases the inflections of the  
290 respective curves are now exceeded by the data points, whatever the conversion factor IFR is used.  
291 This probably means that Italy as a whole have already overcome the maximum number of new  
292 daily infections. It is also important to note that, since the derivative of the logistic function is  
293 symmetric, data which overcome the inflexion point are well constrained, also if they do not cover  
294 the other part of the curve. In general, different growth functions like the Gompertz (1832),  
295 Janoschek (1957) or Richards (1959) sigmoids could be more suited to fit a dataset representing the  
296 curve of the daily number of infections of an epidemic because they allow their derivative to be  
297 non-symmetric and therefore resulting in a more generalized integral function. However, in our  
298 case, besides the very good fit given to our data, the test on the infection curve of China already  
299 shown in Figure 3 demonstrates that the logistic curve is a good approximation of the real process.  
300 The total, true number of infections, at the end of epidemic, is obviously very variable, depending  
301 from the value assumed for IFR. It ranges (on March 25<sup>th</sup>) from a minimum of 134,000 (for

302 IFR=5%) to a maximum of  $3.3 \times 10^6$  (for IFR=0.2%). We note, from best fitting curves, the peak  
303 value of the infections should have been reached around March 8th, four days after the closing of  
304 schools and just before the lockdown of Lombardia and then (two days after) of Italy. Moreover,  
305 our results predict that the point of 95% of the maximum value of the best fitting logistic curves  
306 will be reached on the last week of March, and that, within the first week of April, the real number  
307 of contagious people will be already well within the saturation, so that it practically will not  
308 increase anymore, assuming that lockdown will be maintained until that date.

309

## 310 **Discussion**

311

312 The COVID-19 epidemic in Italy shows very abnormal features, in terms of severity of disease and,  
313 particularly, mortality. The CFR (defined as the ratio between the number of deceased and the  
314 number of recorded infected) reaches here very high values, disproportioned with respect to any  
315 other Country: about 9%, rising to about 11% in the Lombardia Region, which alone represents half  
316 of the total number of infected people in Italy. Estimating a reliable value of the IFR (the ratio  
317 between the number of deceases and the total number of infected people), mainly for a virus hard to  
318 diagnose and requiring complex laboratory procedures, is very difficult. In this case, we considered  
319 two approaches: the first one, used by University of Oxford (Oke and Henegan, 2020) is based on  
320 the minimum statistical reliable CFR value, observed in Germany; the other one benefits of the  
321 possibility to study a very peculiar laboratory-like case study, namely the case of Diamond  
322 Princess, the cruise ship remaining at anchor in Japan (in the port of Yokohama) in which all the  
323 passengers and crew (3.771 people) were tested for COVID-19. Using the CFR of Germany,  
324 CFR=0.4%, University of Oxford assumed a 50% of non recorded infected; in this way, they  
325 computed a value of IFR=0.2%. In the alternative approach, we considered that in the Diamond  
326 Princess cruise ship 705 infected were detected, and 7 of them died. So, the mostly unbiased value  
327 of IFR=CFR=1% can be computed. We have then considered these values as the limiting values  
328 defining the range of IFR. If we assume that the infection number underestimation is the only  
329 reason for the large overestimation of the mortality rate, in order to determine the real number of  
330 infected cases able to correct the apparent mortality to the true value, we should multiply the  
331 ‘official’ number of recorded infections by the ratio between the CFR=9% and the IFR (=0.2% or  
332 1%). In this way, we obtain a real number of infected people in Italy (today, March 25<sup>th</sup>) ranging  
333 between about 670,000 and about 3,300,000 people.

334 Even if this number appears very high (mainly with respect to the total number of reported cases of  
335 less than 90.000 in China, where however, using the same assumption, this amount should be

336 multiplied by 4), it is not unreasonable for several reasons. Firstly, besides the high number of tests  
337 made in Italy (about 240.000), it is however only a small fraction of the total population (60 million  
338 people), and does not take into account the number of asymptomatic and pauci-symptomatic cases.  
339 The large number of potential daily infections in Italy during mobility for work or study can be also  
340 independently estimated by the statistics of the use of public transportation (the most likely to cause  
341 infection due to the high number of people assembled in small space). It results that 30 million  
342 people moves in Italy each day for work or study, with peak value in Lombardia (ISTAT report,  
343 2017): about 56% of these people use public transportation; two thirds of the total travels for more  
344 than 15 minutes. So, considering only such a number of assembled people, and neglecting the likely  
345 high incidence of student assemblage in schools, of people in work places, and the more or less  
346 occasional frequentations of restaurants, clubs, pubs, sport matches, theatres, supermarkets etc., we  
347 get a minimum estimate of about 11 million people staying in close contact each day. A final  
348 indication that such number of effective infected cases is not unrealistic comes from the fit of the  
349 first days of infection, when the curve of increasing cases fitted well an exponential function (Fig.  
350 1); by extrapolating that exponential curve till March 22nd it would predict about 6 million infected  
351 cases; i.e. well beyond the maximum number computed three days after March 25nd by our model.  
352 Obviously, such an hypothesis would assume that the exponential increase lasted till March 25nd  
353 (or however till few days before) and that the real exponential curve was missed because the limited  
354 number of tests progressively sampled a smaller and smaller percentage of the true daily number.  
355 From any point of view, in conclusion, a real number of  $660-3.300 \times 10^3$  infected people today does  
356 not appear unrealistic.

357 Other reasons could however equally affect the very high mortality observed (as CFR): discarding  
358 the existence in Italy of a virus strain significantly different and more aggressive (hypothesis  
359 actually impossible to verify because there is not yet the Italian genome available), a possible  
360 contribution could come from the high air pollution (from particulate matter PM10, PM2.5 and  
361 Ozone) of the zone around the Po Plain, where more than 50% of counted infections are clustered.  
362 Among the other hypothesized causes, the high average age (however lower than Japan, which  
363 showed a much lower CFR) is not likely to play a fundamental role; nor it is the number of smoking  
364 people (lower than the EU average). The observed high antibiotic-resistance, the highest one in  
365 Europe, has been also indicated as a possible contributing factor. However, although such problem  
366 causes in Italy about one third (10.000 cases; the double of France, and fourfold of Germany) of the  
367 total deceases for antibiotic resistance in the whole EU (33.000 cases), it does not appear to  
368 significantly affect the mortality (CFR) associated to seasonal flu (the most reliable comparison we  
369 can do, to infer the possible effect on COVID-19 mortality), which seems not significantly higher

370 with respect to other European countries. We can compare, for instance, the number of deaths  
371 directly or indirectly associated to seasonal flu (the number of indirect deaths is much more  
372 significant in this case, because it is mostly linked to bacteria super-infections) in Italy and in  
373 Germany. The average yearly number of such deaths in Italy is around 8.000 (ISS, 2020); in  
374 Germany, the deaths associated with the 2017-2018 flu, although very severe that year, totalled  
375 25.000 (Koch Institute, 2019)

376 A significant contribution to increase of the “local” IFR could, on the contrary, have come from the  
377 saturation of the public Hospitals, and in particular from the limited number (as compared for  
378 instance to Germany) of ICU. Italy, before the COVID-19 epidemic, had in fact 8.4 ICU per  $10^5$   
379 citizens (5,090 ICU total), whereas Germany had 34 of them (28,000 ICU total). Also, some wrong  
380 actions taken by the public Hospitals in managing the first days of infection (testified by many  
381 media and by a dramatic percentage of infected medical staff), could have significantly enhanced  
382 the infection. This 19 doctors died till now (March 25<sup>th</sup>), and 6205 people from the medical staff  
383 have been infected (ISS daily Info, March 25th, 2020).

384 In this paper, we also use an indirect procedure, based on the analysis of the cumulative number of  
385 deceases which is the only reliable datum, in order to forecast the short-term evolution of the  
386 epidemic in Italy. As we have shown, the number of recorded infections is not statistically reliable  
387 for such analyses, since inhomogeneous in time and in space (among different Regions).  
388 Considering correctly the average time shift of the death with respect to the infection (16 days used  
389 here) we show that decease data, converted to infection data using a large range of possible IFR, are  
390 well fitted by logistic functions, all of them indicating the time of 95% of total infection (i.e. the  
391 starting of the flat part of the function, which represents the end of infection), is expected around  
392 the last days of March. The point of inflection of the logistic best fitting functions, which  
393 corresponds to the peak of the infections in Italy, occurred on March 8th. Looking at Fig.3, this date  
394 occurs just before the lockdown of Lombardia and, after 2 days, of the whole Italy. It then  
395 demonstrates the high mitigating impact of the lockdowns; however, since it also occurs only 4  
396 days after the closing of the schools, it probably indicates it also has been an effective measure to  
397 contain the infection; then suddenly improved by the lockdowns. The high effectiveness of the  
398 closure of schools for containing epidemic spread has been specifically assessed by a number of  
399 epidemiologic studies (i.e. Adda, 2016). These results further confirm that the infection data we  
400 record today are only dependent on the variable and inhomogeneous sampling and have nothing to  
401 do with the true statistical evolution of the epidemic.

402 Looking at these very inhomogeneous data, it is on the other hands very clear that, since several  
403 days, the increase or decrease of new daily infections just depend on the number of tests. This is an

404 obvious consequence of the fact, demonstrated here, that the true number of infections is much  
405 larger than the small sample tested: so, more tests you do, more cases you record. The information  
406 that the epidemic is reaching the saturation (and hopefully end, as forecasted, within the first half of  
407 April), although not apparent from the tested number of new infections, should be seriously  
408 considered in order to decide how to tune and eventually release the next measures for the  
409 containment of the infection

410

## 411 **Conclusions**

412

413 We analysed the COVID-19 epidemic in Italy, which showed to be the largest and most lethal in the  
414 World. We discussed the causes of such anomalous behaviour of the disease in Italy, where  
415 mortality appears much higher than in other Countries. Among the various hypotheses made till  
416 now to explain such an anomalous behaviour, it appears that neither the old age of population, nor  
417 the observed antibiotic-resistance of population (by far the highest one in Europe), nor even the  
418 smoking level, should have significant effects on the observed mortality. The most reasonable effect  
419 would involve a strong underestimation of the extension of the infection (implying a factor 10 to 45  
420 more cases than the tested ones). A possible, further contribution could be given by the very high  
421 fine powder (and Ozone) pollution (one of the highest ones in Europe), which on one hand could  
422 facilitate the virus transmission, on the other hand could make more vulnerable and stressed the  
423 lung, causing heavier damages upon impact with virus. Another factor, emerging from our analyses  
424 (as well as from media), that likely amplified mortality, could have been the scarce preparedness  
425 and possible initial faults of the sanitary system, mainly in Lombardia where the epidemic first blew  
426 up in few days.

427 The problem of underestimation of the number of infections, coupled with a non homogeneous  
428 sampling and testing of the positive cases, makes these data unreliable to use for statistics aimed to  
429 forecast the epidemic evolution. We then use here the cumulative daily number of deceases,  
430 corrected for an appropriate IFR, to simulate the evolution of the epidemic by a logistic function.  
431 When corrected for IFR and time shift between infection and death, these data can be well fitted by  
432 a logistic function, and show that actually the peak of infection has been just overcome, and the  
433 saturation of the curve (end of epidemic) is expected within the first week of April or few days  
434 later. The information here obtained about the possible actual evolution of the epidemic and its  
435 likely end, which is not at all evident from the very inhomogeneous sampling of infections actually  
436 performed, should be seriously considered in order to decide what measures to undertake or relax in  
437 the next future. Moreover, considering the likely effectiveness of the schools closure, which is

438 probably the minimally invasive measure in a social and economic sense, it should be considered as  
439 a primary measure when the lockdown will end. The study of this unprecedented medical  
440 catastrophe will hopefully give robust indications to avoid, in the future, the same errors and  
441 understatements. It will also help to seriously consider the importance to improve the sanitary  
442 systems, whose health and capability should be considered invaluable, also using a purely economic  
443 criterion.

444

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<b>Country</b>	<b>Cases</b>	<b>Deaths</b>	<b>CFR (%)</b>
<i>Lombardia (Italy)</i>	28761	3174	11.0
Italy	63927	6077	9.50
Iran	23049	1812	7.86
Spain	29470	2311	7.84
UK	6650	335	5.03





Netherlands	4749	213	4.48
France	19856	860	4.33
China	81171	3277	4.03
Japan	1193	43	3.60
Turkey	1529	37	2.41
Belgium	3743	88	2.35
Denmark	1460	24	1.64
Switzerland	8795	120	1.36
Sweden	2046	27	1.31
USA	43781	555	1.26
South Korea	8961	111	1.23
Canada	2091	24	1.14
Portugal	2060	23	1.11
Ireland	1125	6	0.53
Austria	4474	21	0.46
Germany	28480	123	0.43
Norway	2625	10	0.38
Australia	1887	7	0.37
Israel	1442	1	0.06

534

535 **Table 1.** Numbers of recorded infected people and deaths in several countries, on March 23rd  
536 2020. Also indicated is the CFR (Case Fatality Ratio) defined as the ratio between the number of  
537 deaths and the number of recorded cases.


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540 **Figure 1.** Total COVID-19 reported cases in Italy from February, 24th to March, 25th according to  
541 Protezione Civile (black dots) with the logistic (blue solid line), exponential (red solid line) and  
542 cubic (green solid line) Dotted black vertical lines mark the dates of Italian school lockdown and  
543 Italy total lockdown; the asterisk indicates that the exponential fit is based on data until March, 9th.  
544 A) fits obtained from the data in semi-logarithmic scale; B) fits obtained by data in linear scale.

545



546

547 **Figure 2.** Total Covid-19 cases reported in China from January, 22nd to February, 25th according  
548 to Johns Hopkins University repository. Black-edged red dots, red-edged black dots and blue-edged  
549 black dots represent total Covid-19 cases registered in China, region of Hubei and China without  
550 Hubei, respectively while red, black and blue dashed lines are the logistic fits of the Chinese, Hubei  
551 and China without Hubei data, respectively.


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558 **Figure 3.** Total deceases reported in Italy from February, 24th to March, 25th according to Italian  
559 Civil Protection (black dots) and the logistic fit (black solid line) obtained from the data. Dotted  
560 vertical lines mark the dates of Italian school lockdown and Italy total lockdown. Also shown is the  
561 Root Mean Square Error (RMSE) computed from the data misfit.

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
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571 **Figure 4.** Estimated (total and undetected) COviD-19 cases in Italy based on three different IFR  
 572 hypotheses: 0,2% (blue and sky blue dots), 1% (red and pink dots) and 5% (green and light green  
 573 dots). Blue and sky blue solid lines represent logistic fits of total and undetected estimated cases  
 574 with IFR=0,2%, respectively. Red and pink solid lines represent logistic fits of total and undetected  
 575 estimated cases with IFR=1%, respectively. Green and light green solid lines represent logistic fits  
 576 of total and undetected estimated cases with IFR=5%, respectively. Black dotted vertical lines mark  
 577 the dates of Codogno area lockdown, Italian schools lockdown, Lombardia lockdown and Italy  
 578 lockdown. Dark orange dashed vertical line marks the inflection points of the three curves,  
 579 representing the total infected estimates; magenta dotted vertical line marks the 95% of the plateau  
 580 of the three curves. Also shown are the Root Mean Square Errors of each curve (corresponding  
 581 color), computed from the data misfit.

582