

The impact of reactive mass vaccination campaigns on measles outbreaks in the Katanga region, Democratic Republic of Congo

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Abstract

The Katanga region in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) has been struck by repeated epidemics of measles. In many of the affected health zones, reactive mass vaccination campaigns were conducted in response to the outbreaks. Here, we attempted to determine how effective campaigns were in curtailing a large outbreak in 2015. Using a model of measles transmission we compared observed case numbers to a counterfactual of no campaigns, by first fitting a model to the data including the campaigns and then re-running this without vaccination. Focusing on eight of the 68 health zones in the Katanga region, we estimated the reactive campaigns to have reduced the size of the outbreaks by approximately 21,000 (IQR: 16,000–27,000; 95% CI: 8300–38,000), or 21% (IQR: 17%–25%, 95% CI: 9.3%–34%) of possible measles cases. There was considerable heterogeneity in the impact of campaigns,

with campaigns starting earlier after the start of an outbreak being more impactful. We further sought to establish whether the spatial pattern of the outbreak could have been determined in advance to help prioritise areas for vaccination campaigns and speed up the response. The best predictors of outbreak size among all the health zones were vaccination coverage derived from cluster surveys and outbreak size in 2010-13. This, combined with the fact that the vast majority of reported cases were in under-5 year olds, would suggest that there are systematic issues of undervaccination. If this was to continue, outbreaks would be expected to continue to occur in the affected health zones at regular intervals, mostly concentrated in under-5 year olds. Taken together, our findings suggest that while a strong routine vaccination regime remains the most effective means of measles control, it might be possible to improve the effectiveness of reactive campaigns by considering predictive factors to trigger a more targeted vaccination response.

Keywords: measles; vaccination; outbreak response; mathematical modelling

1 Introduction

2 There have been repeated outbreaks of measles in the Democratic Republic of
3 Congo (DRC). The Katanga region (formerly known as Katanga province) is in the
4 southeast of the country bordering Zambia and comprises the provinces of Haut-
5 Katanga, Haut-Lomami, Lualaba and Tanganyika. It has experienced large periodic
6 measles outbreaks, such as in 2006–07, 2010–13 [1, 2]. In response to these, reactive
7 mass vaccination campaigns have been conducted to protect those assumed to be at
8 risk both within the outbreak area and beyond.

9 Standard measles epidemic responses include reinforcing measles surveillance in
10 affected areas, providing free care to reduce measles mortality, and reactive vac-
11 cination campaigns in order to control measles transmission. In collaboration with

12 the World Health Organization (WHO) Regional Office for Africa (AFRO) and the
13 United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) sup-
14 ported the Ministry of Health to respond to various measles outbreaks including
15 two major measles outbreaks in the Katanga region. Firstly, in 2010–13, a measles
16 epidemic was reported with over 96,000 suspected cases reported, 77% of which oc-
17 curred in children under 5 years of age, and more than 1400 deaths [2]. In 2011, in
18 response to the ongoing epidemic, MSF vaccinated more than 1.8 million children 26
19 of the 68 health zones in the Katanga region [1]. Secondly, in February 2015, a new
20 measles epidemic started in Katanga, DRC, lasting the whole year and resulting in
21 over 40,000 cases and more than 400 deaths in 2015 [3]. MSF responded with the
22 standard epidemic responses including a reactive vaccination campaign in order to
23 stop measles transmission during epidemics, targeting more than 25 health zones.

24 The time interval between the outbreak starting in different parts of Katanga
25 and the vaccination response implemented varied. Previously, modelling studies in
26 Niger have demonstrated that even late vaccination intervention in response to an
27 outbreak could prevent a large number of cases, though early intervention will al-
28 ways have a larger impact [4, 5, 6, 7]. However, this may be context-specific and
29 vary with local epidemiology and outbreak patterns. The response to the Katanga
30 outbreak provides an opportunity to retrospectively study the effectiveness of the
31 campaigns conducted in mitigating excess morbidity. More generally, important
32 lessons could be learned about the relationship between response times and effec-
33 tiveness of campaigns, and how campaign targets could be selected in the future to
34 ensure greatest impact.

35 We studied the 2015 measles outbreak and responsive mass vaccination cam-
36 paigns conducted as part of the standard epidemic response to assess whether the
37 most-affected areas could have been predicted from information on previous out-
38 breaks and administrative or otherwise estimated vaccination coverage. We further
39 investigated the outbreak in several health zones using a mathematical model of
40 measles transmission, to quantify the impact of vaccination campaigns that were

41 conducted in those areas.

42 **Methods**

43 **Data sources and cleaning**

44 Suspected measles cases (WHO definition) from 2010–16 were collated from the
45 integrated disease surveillance (IDS) system, described previously in [2]. These
46 data are split into age groups 1-4 years and 5 years and over, at the level of health
47 zones. The database did not contain any information on cases under the age of 1
48 year.

49 Administrative coverage data from 2009-16 collected by the Ministry of Health
50 was available as the number of doses administered per week was collected at the
51 level of health zones, separated into age groups 9-11 months and 12-23 months.

52 Population denominators were extracted from the coverage data. Since the last
53 census in DRC prior to this study had been done in 1981, these numbers are subject
54 to considerable uncertainty.

55 We further used vaccination coverage estimates from a previous study [8]. These
56 used data collected as part of the Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) in 2013–
57 14, extrapolated from geo-located information on children’s vaccination status from
58 vaccine cards and parental recall. We averaged the estimates by month of age to
59 arrive at the proportion of under-5 year olds that were unvaccinated, that is had
60 received no dose of measles-containing vaccine.

61 Information on reactive mass vaccination campaigns conducted in 2015 was ex-
62 tracted from MSF reports. The total number of vaccine doses administered was
63 collated at the level of health zones, and at various temporal resolutions from days
64 to a single number of doses delivered for a whole campaign.

65 Factors that could predict outbreak size

66 We tested the predictability of outbreaks from demographic factors and outbreak
67 and vaccination history in a negative binomial Generalized Linear Model with log-
68 arithmic link. Robust standard errors and p-values were calculated using the *sand-*
69 *wich R* package [9, 10]. The number of suspected cases reported during the 2015
70 outbreak at the health zone level was modelled as a function of health zone popu-
71 lation size, the number of cases in the 2010–13 outbreak, MoH administrative and
72 estimated vaccination coverage.

73 Modelling measles with mass vaccination campaigns

74 We modelled measles transmission at the level of health zones using a stochastic
75 transmission model with a fixed time step of 2 weeks, corresponding to the generation
76 time of measles [11]. At each time step t , the number of new infections in health
77 zone i , I_{it} was drawn from a negative binomial distribution with mean $\lambda_{it}S_{i(t-1)}$
78 and shape m , allowing for overdispersion of transmission, or superspreading [12]:

$$I_{it} \sim \text{NB}(\lambda_{it}S_{i(t-1)}, m)$$

79 where $S_{i(t-1)}$ and $I_{i(t-1)}$ are the number of people susceptible and infected,
80 respectively, at time $t-1$, and λ_{it} is the force of infection experienced by susceptibles
81 in health zone i at time t :

$$\lambda_{it} = R_0 \frac{I_{i(t-1)}}{N_i}$$

82 where N_i is the population size of health zone i , R_0 is the basic reproduction
83 number.

84 When a mass vaccination campaign was conducted, the number of susceptible
85 people immunised was calculated by multiplying the number of doses administered

86 with the proportion of the population still susceptible S_{it}/N_i , and a campaign effi-
87 ciency factor e_i , estimated as part of the inference procedure described below. This
88 factor comprises both vaccine efficacy and the efficiency in targeting susceptible
89 children, which were not identifiable separately. With a perfect vaccine and random
90 distribution, this would take a value of 1. If vaccines were preferentially given to
91 susceptibles, it would take values of greater than 1 (subject to vaccine efficacy). If
92 vaccines were preferentially given to already immune children, it would take values
93 of less than 1.

94 During a two-week span, half of vaccinations were modelled to be administered
95 before transmission occurred and half afterwards. While the measles vaccine takes
96 2 weeks to come into effect, it provides potentially high level of protection from
97 72 hours after administration [13, 14, 15]. We therefore assumed that vaccination
98 starts to fully immunise a child instantaneously.

99 For the counterfactual scenarios of how the outbreaks would have evolved with-
100 out a reactive mass vaccination, we simulated the model from the time of the mass
101 vaccination campaigns, but without reducing the number of susceptibles as a con-
102 sequence of vaccination. We then drew samples from the joint distribution of tra-
103 jectories and observations, to obtain alternative trajectories of observed cases. To
104 evaluate the impact of the campaigns, we calculated the reduction in the number of
105 cases observed in each of the trajectories. If this yielded a negative difference (i.e., if
106 random sampling yielded alternative trajectories with more cases than the observed
107 ones), we treated the impact as 0 (i.e., same number of cases in both scenarios).

108 **Selection of health zones for fitting and estimating populations**

109 The health zones selected for the dynamic model were ones that reported more
110 than 10 cases in at least one week in 2015 and had a reactive mass vaccination
111 campaign with the number of doses delivered and results from a follow-up coverage
112 survey available. A total of eight health zones were modelled, including the one

113 that saw most cases (Malemba-Nkulu, 8856 reported cases) and 7 of the 13 health
114 zones with most cases in 2015: Ankoro (3910), Kinkondja (2773), Mukanga (2723),
115 Bukama (2632), Songa (928) and Kabalo (904).

116 Since a large proportion of cases was found in children (77% in 1-to-5 year olds,
117 with no further age-breakdown available), and none of the vaccination campaigns
118 targeted over-15 year olds, we modelled measles transmission to be occurring ex-
119 clusively in under-5 year olds. The relevant population sizes were estimated as the
120 number of doses administered in the vaccination campaigns divided by the coverage
121 estimated from concurrent vaccination surveys. Where vaccination campaigns were
122 limited to under-5 or under-10 year olds, we estimated the total population size
123 under 15 as 2.72 or 1.39 times the estimated population size, respectively, based on
124 multipliers used for estimating the sizes of age groups in the administrative coverage
125 data provided.

126 **Model fitting and counterfactual scenarios**

127 The model was fitted simultaneously to the eight selected health zones. The likeli-
128 hood of observing bi-weekly incidence D_{it} in health zone i at time t was taken to
129 follow a negative binomial distribution with fixed overdispersion ϕ .

$$D_{it} \sim \text{NB}(\rho I_{it} + \mu, \phi)$$

130 where ρ is the proportion of cases that is reported, μ is the rate of background
131 reporting of measles, either due to cases that were not part of the epidemic or
132 misclassification, for example of rubella cases, and ϕ is the reporting overdispersion.

133 The value of the basic reproduction number R_0 , the efficacy of mass vaccination
134 e_i , mean reporting rate ρ , background reporting rate m , observation overdispersions,
135 the proportion immune r_{i0} in health zone I and the mean number of individuals
136 infectious I_{i0} at the first data point with at least 10 cases in health zone i (taken

137 to be the start of the time series), were all estimated as part of the inference proce-
 138 dure, as well as likely trajectories of the state variables. The reporting rate ρ_i and
 139 initial number infectious I_{i0} was allowed to vary between health zones. The prior
 140 distribution on the mean reporting rate was weakly informed by a coverage survey
 141 that was conducted in Kabalo. The initial proportion immune r_{i0} was estimated
 142 with a mean and lower bound given by the vaccination coverage per health zone v_i
 143 estimated in [8]. Informed or regularising prior distributions of the parameters to
 144 be estimated are shown in Table 1.

Table 1: *Prior distributions of parameters used in the transmission model. The distribution of the basic reproduction number was truncated at a lower bound of 0. The proportion initially immune was truncated to be between v_i and 1. The mean and actual proportions reported were truncated to be between 0 and 1. The number initially infectious were truncated at a lower bound of 0.*

Parameter	Symbol	Prior distribution	Source
Basic reproduction number	R_0	Gaussian(15, 5)	[16]
Overdispersion of transmission	m	Gamma(1, 0.1)	n/a
Efficacy of campaigns	e_i	Gaussian(1, 1)	n/a
Background reporting	μ	Gamma(1,1)	n/a
Proportion initially immune	r_{0i}	Gaussian(v_i , 1)	[8]
Mean proportion reported	ρ	Gaussian(0.059, 0.009)	[17]
Proportion reported	ρ_i	Gaussian(ρ , 0.1)	n/a
Mean initially infectious	I_0	Gamma(2, 5)	n/a
Number initially infectious	I_{0i}	Gamma($\frac{I_0}{r_{0i}}$, $\sqrt{\frac{I_0}{r_{0i}}}$)	n/a
Overdispersion of reporting	ϕ	Gamma(1, 0.1)	n/a

145 The model was fitted to the data using a particle filter in combination with
 146 Metropolis-Hastings Markov chain Monte Carlo (pMCMC) with the *libbi* soft-
 147 ware library [18] as implemented in the *RBi* package using the statistical software
 148 *R* [19, 20]. The number of particles and proposal distribution was adapted using
 149 the *RBi.helpers* package [21], before the pMCMC sampler was run to generate 4096
 150 samples after thinning, with 262,144 particles. The inference pipeline was run on
 151 an Nvidia Tesla P100 16GB NVLink GPU.

152 Results

153 Outbreak size

154 In total, 40,562 cases and 485 deaths were reported in the Katanga region over
155 the course of the year (case-fatality ratio: 1.2%). The majority of cases were re-
156 ported from Haut-Lomami (23,984, 59%) and Tanganyika (12,110, 30%) provinces,
157 with the outbreak in Tanganyika peaking significantly later than the one in Haut-
158 Lomami (Fig. 2). Of the 68 health zones, 16 reported over 90% of cases (Fig. 1).




Figure 1: *Number of cases by health zone in the Katanga region, 2015.*

159 Predictability of outbreak size

160 There was a positive correlation between reported incidence in the 2010–13 outbreak
161 and the 2015 outbreak (Pearson's $r=0.31$, $p=0.01$, Fig. 3). All the health zones with




Figure 2: Number of cases by age group and province in Katanga, 2015.

162 more than 10 cases per 1000 in 2015 (Malemba-Nkulu, Kinkondja, Manono, Ankoro,
163 Lwamba, Mitwaba, Mukanga, Bukama) had also reported more than 5 cases per
164 1000 in 2010–13.

165 Further, there was a positive correlation of reported incidence in 2015 and admin-
166 istrative vaccination coverage, and a negative correlation with coverage as estimated
167 from DHS data (Fig. 4).

168 Combining these factors and population size in a regression model confirms these
169 correlations, with coefficients corresponding to the number of cases in 2010–13 and
170 vaccination coverage estimated by DHS as strongest predictors of the number of
171 cases that occurred in 2015 (Table 2). Population size and routine vaccination
172 coverage as measured by the EPI programme did not have a strong influence on the
173 number of cases in 2015. Correlation between model predictions and true number
174 of cases was 0.3 (95% CI 0.1-0.5, $p=0.01$, Fig. 5).

175 To further investigate the relationships underlying the results, we tested an ad-




Figure 3: Incidence (number of cases divided by estimated population size) in 2010–13 vs 2015. Health zones with more than 5 cases per 1000 in 2015 are indicated in black, and other health zones with more than 10 cases per 1000 in 2010–13 in red.




Figure 4: Vaccination coverage versus reported incidence (number of cases divided by estimated population size) in 2015. Linear trends are indicated by blue lines, with 95% confidence intervals indicated in grey. A) Mean vaccination coverage in 2010–15 as measured by the EPI programme. B) Vaccination coverage estimated from DHS data.

Table 2: Regression coefficients for model of case numbers in 2015, with lower and upper 95% confidence interval limits.

Coefficient	Estimate	p-value	Lower limit	Upper limit
(Intercept)	5.7	<0.001	5.4	6.1
Population size	0.1	0.8	-0.4	0.6
Number of cases 2010–13	0.8	<0.001	0.2	1.3
Mean EPI coverage 2010–15	0.3	0.09	-0.1	0.7
DHS coverage estimate	-1.3	<0.001	-1.8	-0.9

176 dditional model variant, where we distinguished the four provinces comprising the
177 Katanga region in the model, to determine whether effects were being identified at
178 the fine level of the health zone or the coarser province level. In that case, province
179 as a categorical explanatory variable in the regression replaced some of the predictive
180 value both of the number of cases in 2010–13 (regression coefficient 0.4, $p=0.05$) and
181 the coverage estimate from DHS data (-1.1 , $p<0.001$), but both retained predictive
182 value, the coverage estimate strongly so. This suggests that some predictive value
183 of case numbers in 2010–13, and strong predictive value of the coverage estimate
184 was retained at the lower level of the health zone.




Figure 5: Predictions from the regression model vs. true number of cases. As in Fig. 3, health zones with more than 5 cases per 1000 in 2015 are indicated in black, and other health zones with more than 10 cases per 1000 in 2010–13 in red.

185 The impact of mass vaccination campaigns

186 To investigate the impact of the mass vaccination campaign in more detail, we
187 fitted a dynamic model to the case trajectories in 8 health zones (Fig. 6). We
188 estimated a basic reproduction number of 4.3 (mean; interquartile range, IQR: 4.0–
189 4.5) and an average reporting rate of 24% (IQR: 19%–29%), corresponding to a
190 total of 77,000 (IQR: 73,000–81,000; 95% CI: 66,000–91,000) estimated cases from
191 19,079 reported cases in the 8 health zones. On average, 55% (IQR: 49%–62%) of

192 under-5 year olds were estimated to have been immune before the outbreak. The
 193 estimated campaign efficacy factor ranged from 0.21 (IQR: 0.09–0.31) in Kinkondja
 194 to 0.59 (IQR: 0.33–0.83) in Ankoro.

Table 3: *Summary of posterior estimates.*

Parameter	Symbol	Posterior mean	(IQR)
Basic reproduction number	R_0	4.3	(4.0–4.5)
Overdispersion of transmission	m	0.17	(0.14–0.2)
Efficacy of campaigns (mean)	e_i	0.34	(0.14–0.48)
Background reporting	μ	1.4	(1.0–1.7)
Proportion initially immune (mean)	r_{0i}	0.55	(0.49–0.62)
Number initially infectious (mean)	I_{0i}	66	(46–78)
Proportion of cases reported (mean)	ρ_i	0.24	(0.19–0.29)
Overdispersion of reporting	ϕ	0.044	(0.022–0.061)

195 In total, we estimate that 21,000 (IQR: 16,000–27,000; 95% CI: 8300–38,000)
 196 cases were averted by the vaccination campaigns in the seven health zones analysed,
 197 corresponding to relative reduction in case load of 21% (IQR: 17%–25%, 95% CI:
 198 9.3%–34%). Of the approximately 250,000 doses delivered to under-5 year olds
 199 in the 8 health zones, we estimated 22,000 (IQR: 17,000–26,000, 95% CI: 11,000–
 200 37,000) or 9.2% (IQR: 7.2%–11%, 95% CI: 4.5%–15%) of administered doses went
 201 to susceptible children.

202 There was heterogeneity in impact between health zones. The greatest abso-
 203 lute impact achieved by a mass vaccination campaign in the health zones investi-
 204 gated was in Malemba-Nkulu with 6800 (IQR: 4000–9100; 95% CI: 0–17,000) cases
 205 averted with 26,208 doses, while the greatest relative impact was in Kabalo with a
 206 33% (IQR: 17%–54%; 95% CI: 0%–73%) reduction in case load from an estimated
 207 20,727 doses (Table 4). On the other hand, only 230 (IQR: 0–810; 95% CI: 0–
 208 2400) or 2.4% (IQR: 0%–11%; 95% CI: 0%–29%) of cases were estimated to have
 209 been averted in Bukama from an estimate 31,400 doses. Speed of implementation
 210 of the mass vaccination campaign (or shorter delay to implementation) was highly
 211 correlated with a greater relative reduction of cases (Pearson’s $p = -0.85$, $p=0.008$).




Figure 6: Model fits (black) to the 2015 data and counterfactual scenarios without mass vaccination campaigns (red). The data are shown as black dots, and periods of mass vaccination campaigns as blue vertical bars. Median fitted trajectories are shown as lines, 50% (dark grey) and 95% (light grey) credible intervals as shades.

Table 4: *Absolute and relative impact of mass vaccination campaigns in different health zones. Estimates shown are posterior means. The delay shown in the last column is the number of weeks between the start of the outbreak (end of the first two-week period with more than 10 cases) and the beginning of the vaccination campaign.*

Health zone	Doses (est.)	Cases averted	(IQR, 95% CI)	Relative reduction	(IQR, 95% CI)	Delay (weeks)
Ankoro	26,199	4800	(2200–7300, 0–12,000)	24%	(13%–37%,0%–55%)	11
Bukama	34,100	230	(0–810, 0–2400)	2.4%	(0%–11%,0%–29%)	25
Kabalo	20,727	3000	(1000–4700, 0–9100)	33%	(17%–54%,0%–73%)	13
Kinkondja	20,792	510	(0–970, 0–2800)	5.5%	(0%–12%,0%–29%)	20
Lwamba	44,148	3400	(870–5400, 0–12,000)	21%	(6.7%–35%,0%–61%)	14
Malembe-Nkulu	46,330	6800	(4000–9100, 0–17,000)	23%	(16%–31%,0%–47%)	14
Mukanga	30,133	2200	(670–3500, 0–6800)	15%	(5.7%–25%,0%–44%)	17
Songa	19,660	970	(240–1500, 0–3300)	19%	(6.2%–32%,0%–54%)	11

212 Discussion

213 In spite of repeated strategic and reactive vaccination campaigns, large measles
214 outbreaks continue to occur in Katanga, DRC, causing significant morbidity and
215 mortality. Strategies to mitigate the burden of measles are urgently needed. Here
216 we conducted both predictive and retrospective modelling of the measles outbreaks
217 in Katanga in 2015, with the aim to evaluate the impact of the vaccination response
218 as well as potential for improvement.

219 The predictability of outbreaks is related to the quality of the available data. We
220 found little relationship between reported administrative vaccination coverage and
221 observed incidence. In fact, there was a small positive correlation, that is more cases
222 occur where vaccination uptake as indicated by the EPI programme is higher. This
223 could be because high routine vaccination rates might be an indicator of surveillance
224 quality and therefore case reporting. At the same time, Strategic Immunisation
225 Activities were conducted across Katanga after the 2011 outbreak [22]. We did not
226 have access to any details of these campaigns, which may have been targeted at areas
227 with low reported vaccination rates, thus raising immunity in those health zones.
228 Not all of the suspected cases included in this study may have been measles and
229 instead have been misdiagnoses due to rubella or other causes of rash [23]. While we
230 included a parameter for misclassification in the modelling analysis, this is difficult
231 to identify and may be an underestimate. Lastly, there is uncertainty around the

232 population estimates used as denominator when estimating coverage, as high rates
233 of migration and urban growth make existing data quickly outdated.

234 Vaccination rates as estimated from cluster surveys as part of the DHS pro-
235 gramme, on the other hand, were well correlated with case data, with higher vac-
236 cination rates corresponding to lower case burden. These estimates encompass all
237 vaccination activities and not just routine immunisation, and they do not suffer
238 from denominator issues caused by uncertainty in the population sizes within health
239 zones.

240 Reconstructing the outbreak with a mathematical model of the case trajectories
241 suggested that reactive mass vaccination campaigns reduced the case load substan-
242 tially, and more so the earlier it was implemented. We estimated that tens of thou-
243 sands of susceptibles were immunised during those campaigns and, consequently,
244 tens of thousands of cases averted in under-5 year olds. While the estimated over-
245 all proportion of doses that went to susceptibles may appear low at approximately
246 10%, this must be seen in the context of conducting vaccination campaigns during
247 ongoing outbreaks, where part of the population may already have been infected
248 and thus naturally immunised. In all health zones, we estimated that vaccines were
249 preferentially given to immune children, who may have been immunised through
250 routine vaccination, been targeted in previous campaigns, or infected and acquired
251 natural immunity during the ongoing or previous outbreaks. At the same time, the
252 estimated 21,000 cases averted correspond to a reduction in burden of over 20%.
253 In the health zones modelled, the case-fatality ratio in the reported data was 1.2%,
254 suggesting that around a hundred infant lives were probably saved by the campaigns.

255 Our transmission model suffered from several limitations. We did not have access
256 to an age breakdown of cases older than 5 years, and information on under-1 year olds
257 was missing completely. Because of this, we only modelled transmission in under-
258 5 year olds. At 77% of reported cases, it seems safe to assume that transmission
259 in under-5 year olds was driving the outbreaks. The estimated basic reproduction
260 number of 4.3 (IQR: 4.0–4.5) is small in comparison with other settings, possibly

261 because transmission does not occur in school-like settings with close mixing of
262 large numbers of children, but rather households and communities affecting children
263 before they reach school age.

264 The estimated impact of the campaigns might have been greater if cases averted
265 in over 5-year olds had been taken into account. We further ignored any spatial
266 progression of the outbreak or connectivity between health zones and modelled each
267 area in isolation. In reality, mass vaccination campaigns that reduced cases in one
268 area may well have prevented subsequent cases in nearby areas in other health zones.
269 Lastly, we assumed constant reporting rates. If, on the other hand, reporting quality
270 changes between regions or over time, it would affect our fits which would interpret
271 these changes as changes in transmission rather than reporting.

272 In spite of enormous efforts, measles is proving difficult to control in Katanga.
273 On the 10th June 2019, the DRC Ministry of Health officially declared a new measles
274 outbreak in 23 out of the 26 provinces of DRC, with initial cases for this outbreak
275 reported in late 2018. This new measles outbreak coincided with an ongoing Ebola
276 outbreak in the North Kivu and Ituri provinces of DRC which had begun in August
277 2018. There have been suggestions that the diversion of resources and attention
278 towards the Ebola response may have reduced the healthcare capacity required to
279 respond to a surge in measles cases [24]. Although at the time of writing, the health
280 zones most affected by the measles outbreak were outside the area where Ebola was
281 mostly concentrated, it has been shown during the 2013–16 outbreak in West Africa
282 that reduced vaccination services as a result of an Ebola outbreak can have a severe
283 impact on measles circulation [25, 26, 27].

284 The ability to partly predict the case load in 2015 from outbreaks in 2010–13 at
285 the province level suggests that there might be underlying problems in the provision
286 of routine immunisation services that did not change in the intervening time. At
287 the end of outbreaks as big as the ones occurring in Katanga, not many children are
288 left susceptible, whether a mass vaccination campaign has been conducted or not.
289 The fact that another big outbreak could happen so soon after the last suggests a

290 rapid increase in susceptibles that have not been served by the routine vaccination
291 programme, and strengthening this should be a priority. At the same time, it is
292 clear that the mass vaccination campaigns only prevent part of the observed cases,
293 partly because of unavoidable delays in confirming an outbreak and launching a
294 campaign. Preventive strategies based on predictive models have a potential to
295 have a much greater impact if they can prevent outbreaks altogether, but their use
296 is based on the predictive potential of the models used. We found that vaccination
297 estimates based on a spatial model applied previously to vaccination survey data was
298 a good predictor of outbreak size at the relatively fine level of health zones. There is
299 enormous promise in using such estimates to guide strategic immunisation activities
300 and close any existing gaps in immunity. As has been proven many times over,
301 it is only through strong and comprehensive routine vaccination, supplemented by
302 strategic campaigns where necessary, that sustained measles control and, ultimately,
303 elimination can be achieved.

304 **Ethics**

305 This research fulfilled the exemption criteria set by the MSF Ethics Review
306 Board (ERB) for a posteriori analyses of routinely collected clinical data and thus
307 did not require MSF ERB review.

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320 Data statement

321 All code and data used to produce the results are available in a public repository at
322 <https://github.com/sbfnk/measles.katanga>.

323 Author statement

324 All authors attest they meet the ICMJE criteria for authorship.

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